1. Summary

The Syrian Transitional Government's (STG) coercive military campaign against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham/Al-Nusra), has provoked a security breakdown. This collapse has facilitated the escape of ISIS detainees, significantly elevating risks to regional stability, minority communities, and British security interests.

This escape of ISIS detainees is a direct consequence of Damascus's policy of forcefully integrating minority communities. The Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), currently the most credible democratic governance model in Syria, faces military pressure to disarm and dissolve its institutions, even as minority communities across Syria endure routine attacks by the STG.

Despite a reported agreement between the SDF and STG, the future of democracy in Syria remains precarious.

The UK's policy must therefore focus on:

• Supporting genuine political dialogue.
• Opposing forced military integration.
• Maintaining crucial safeguards against a resurgence of ISIS.

These objectives are only achievable within a decentralised, federal Syrian state that upholds pluralism, diversity, and regional autonomy. Furthermore, any premature disarmament of SDF forces, without established security transition protocols, poses a direct and serious threat to Syrian, British and European security.

2. Current Situation: Key Facts

Human Rights Record of the Transitional Government

Parliamentarians should be aware of documented atrocities committed by forces now integrated into Syria's transitional government:

• Following clashes between government forces and the SDF, ISIS fighters escaped from al-Shaddadi prison on 19 January. Such forced military operations destabilise detention security. 

• Because of military operations led by the Syrian Transitional Government, The SDF was forced to withdraw from the al-Hol camp, which holds roughly 24,000 ISIS-linked individuals. The SDF has been guarding approximately 9,000 ISIS detainees across northeast Syria since defeating ISIS and seizing its territory. Meanwhile, under STG rule, ISIS attacks increased from 73 recorded incidents in 2024 to 117 in January–August 2025 alone. 
• The United States military wisely does not trust the new Syrian state to secure these prisoners. US Central Command has initiated an emergency transfer of up to 7,000 ISIS detainees out of Syria and into Iraq to prevent a mass breakout
• This is happening, as the HTS continues to demonstrate its inability to maintain military discipline on the various armed groups absorbed by the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
• Groups absorbed by the ministry of defense include various forces traditionally allied with the HTS, including battalions led by Dhul-Qarnayn Zannur al-Basr Abdul Hamid, the former leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, a group where "the majority of whose members had previously pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)"; Hurras al-din, an al-Qaeda linked group; and foreign battalions linked in the Turkistan region of Xinjiang, Chechnya and East Asia. 
• The HTS and ISIS share a common lineage :HTS and ISIS were both offshoots of Al Qaeda in Syria. it is therefore questionable whether the newly formed Syrian army is a credible and reliable UK partner to oversee the imprisonment of ISIS terrorists.  
• In the latest military operations against the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, over 134,000 were forcibly displaced, many of whom were Kurds facing displacement for the second time by some of the same forces. Over 1,000 Alawites, including 745 civilians were massacred in March 2025, as documented by Human Rights Watch. These killings occurred during operations conducted by forces now under central government command.

•       Sectarian violence against Druze and Bedouin communities in Sweida in July 2025 has been extensively documented by independent monitors.
•       Video evidence shows Syrian Army soldiers openly displaying ISIS insignia, raising serious questions about vetting procedures.
•       Commanders with documented records of abuse under the Assad regime have been integrated into the new military structure without accountability processes.

War Crimes:

During military operations in Aleppo and northeast Syria in January 2026, transitional government forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the cutting of Aleppo's primary water supply at the Babiri Pumping Station on 10 January—a top-tier war crime under international law. This was only reversed following US diplomatic intervention.

3. Why Presidential Decrees Are Insufficient

Executive Decree 2026/13, issued on 16 January 2026 and cited as evidence of Kurdish rights protection, provides no meaningful guarantees. Parliamentarians should note:

•       Presidential decrees are reversible administrative acts, not constitutional protections. They can be revoked at any time by executive decision.
•       The constitutional framework retains absolute presidential powers, criminalises 'calls for division' (a provision historically used to suppress minority political expression), and establishes Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation—conditions incompatible with meaningful minority rights.
•       The state's official name remains the 'Syrian Arab Republic' despite the presence of substantial non-Arab populations, including Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians.
•       The DAANES explicitly rejected Decree 2026/13 as inadequate.
•       Multiple external observers confirm zero tangible progress on the March 2025 agreement since signing.

These offers are marginally different from Assad's 2011 reform proposals—promises designed to delay international pressure rather than deliver substantive change.

On 30 January 2026, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced a new comprehensive agreement with the Syrian transitional government, including a ceasefire, phased military integration, and commitments on Kurdish civil and educational rights. While this development is notable, significant risks remain regarding implementation and the continued commitment by all parties to the principles of coexistence. Previous agreements—including those of March 2025 and January 2026—have seen minimal tangible progress. Parliamentarians should monitor whether this agreement delivers substantive protections or follows the same pattern of rhetorical commitment without meaningful follow-through.

4. The Democratic Autonomous Administration: A Viable Alternative

The DAANES governs approximately four million people through a system of grassroots democratic councils, gender-balanced co-leadership, and multi-ethnic power-sharing. It has maintained relative stability, protected religious minorities, and implemented the most advanced women's rights framework anywhere in the Middle East. Its institutions include:

•       Elected local councils with mandatory gender quotas
•       Autonomous women's institutions with authority over gender-based violence cases
•       Constitutional protections for Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, and Armenian communities
•       Effective counter-terrorism operations that destroyed ISIS's territorial caliphate

Forced dissolution of these institutions—under military pressure rather than negotiated political settlement—would eliminate the only functioning democratic governance in Syria and abandon the communities who built it.

5. Recommendations for UK Policy

We urge UK parliamentarians to press the Government to:

1.     Oppose forced military integration. Any political settlement must emerge from genuine dialogue, not military coercion. The UK should not endorse agreements imposed under threat of force.
2.     Support federal or decentralised arrangements. Constitutional guarantees—not reversible decrees—are required to protect Kurdish, Assyrian, and other minority communities. This means binding provisions for regional autonomy, language rights, and political representation.
3.     Maintain ISIS detention security. The UK must ensure that any security transition includes robust protocols for the continued detention of ISIS fighters. Rushed disarmament without proper handover mechanisms poses direct risks to British national security.
4.     Withhold political and financial legitimisation of the transitional government until it demonstrates commitment to accountability for documented atrocities, meaningful inclusion of all communities in governance, and protection of women's rights.
5.     Support independent investigations into all alleged violations by all parties, including the massacres of Alawite civilians in March 2025 and sectarian violence in Sweida.
6.     Protect the gains of the women's revolution. Any UK engagement on Syria must explicitly safeguard achievements in gender equality and women's political participation. These must not be traded away for expedient 'stability.'

6. Conclusion

The Kurdish community in Syria—alongside Assyrians, Arabs, and other communities within the DAANES—have built democratic institutions under conditions of war. They have protected religious minorities, advanced women's political participation, and held the line against ISIS at enormous cost. They deserve political recognition, not forced submission to authorities with documented records of sectarian violence.

UK policy must be informed by the full picture—including documented atrocities by transitional government forces, the inadequacy of reversible presidential decrees, and the proven risks of hasty security transitions. A durable peace in Syria requires genuine inclusion: constitutional protections, federal arrangements, and meaningful political access for all communities.

The UK has both the opportunity and the responsibility to support that outcome.