A new coalition government in Iraq is yet to be formed despite various meetings by the political parties in the past two months. The Council of Representative’s election of a new president has also been postponed several times during the past two months. On 18 April, the Turkish army started a new military operation against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas in the Zap, Metina and Avashin regions, just south of the Turkey-Iraq border, in the territory of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Statements by Kurdish and Iraqi officials seem to indicate the operation has the backing of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad. In the meantime, the Iraqi army increased its presence in the Sinjar region, home to the Yezidis, where a self-declared Yezidi autonomous administration has been governing the area. Turkey had threatened to invade the territory in the past and put pressure on the Iraqi government to end the Yezidi autonomous administration because Turkey claims it is affiliated with the PKK. In Syria, there has been an escalation in attacks by Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in the territory of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Tensions with the Syrian state and an increase in the attacks by Islamic State (IS) were the other problems that consumed the energy of the AANES officials during the past two months.  

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

On 13 March, several ballistic missiles were fired near the site of the new US consulate in Erbil, and it damaged the headquarters of the Kurdistan 24 TV station. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) released a statement that acknowledged it carried out the attack: “Last night, the strategic center of the Zionist conspiracy and evil was targeted by the powerful missiles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”. 

Disagreements among the Kurdish parties about the timing of the KRI’s next parliamentary elections continued, with the KDP insisting that the election should take place on the scheduled date of 1 October 2022 and the opposition proposing amendments to the electoral law to break each governorate into multiple constituencies. 

On 21 April, Kurdish media reported the murder of a 35-year-old woman by her husband in Erbil, which again focused attention on the issue of violence against women in the KRI. On this occasion, the suspect was arrested, and the authorities started an investigation into the murder. On 7 March, the body of Eman Sami Maghdid was discovered in Erbil two days after she went missing. She was married at the age of 12, and as an active user of the TikTok platform, her posts were often criticised for undermining the dominant conservative social norms. Her uncle was arrested in relation to her murder. 

Sinjar tensions 

Tensions in the Sinjar district, North-West of Iraq, have been rising in recent months, with the Iraqi military increasing its presence and preparing to control the region by force. The Yezidi forces, the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), have been defending the region and its population in the Iraqi military's absence, and they have indicated that they will resist any advances by the Iraqi military to take control of the region by force. A minor clash ensued when Iraqi soldiers tried to take a checkpoint on 17 and 18 April, with casualties from both sides reported. A 3.75 metre high, 1 metre wide, and 200-kilometre long wall on the Iraq-Syria border has also been proposed as part of the measures Iraq wants to implement to secure the region. The Yezidis have been vehemently opposing the wall's construction because they say it will cut-off trade and end the Yezidis' cooperation with the AANES's security forces. The Yezidis were abandoned by the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga forces when IS attacked Sinjar in August 2014. Most of them were saved from genocide by the intervention of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). After this tragic event, the Yezidis lost their trust in the Iraqi military and Kurdish peshmerga forces. They claim that their self-managed defence forces should protect the region, with their autonomous administration recognised as a legitimate authority.   

Political stalemate in Iraq

Iraqi political parties are yet to agree on a new coalition government despite six months passing after the early parliamentary elections. In January, Mohammad al-Halbousi was re-elected as the speaker of the Council of Representatives, but the Iraqi political parties have been unable to agree on a new president or form a new broad based coalition government. Iraqi political parties usually take their time to decide on a new coalition government, but this has been the most protracted government formation process since Iraq’s transformation to democracy in 2005. The divisions within the Shia bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance have forced the leading party, the Sadrist movement, to form a coalition government with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance, dubbed the National Salvation Coalition. This bloc has persuaded other smaller parties and independent MPs, but their numbers fall short of the two-thirds majority, or 220 MPs needed at the Council of Representatives to elect a new president. The position of the presidency, which has been held by a candidate affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has been challenging to fill after the KDP insisted on getting its candidate Rebar Ahmed elected. The PUK has been acting as part of the Coordination Framework alliance forged by Nouri al-Maliki and the pro-Iran Shia Fatah Alliance. The Coordination Framework does not have a sufficient number of MPs to lead the formation of the new coalition government or elect its preferred presidential candidate, but it has enough support to frustrate the process. The lack of progress on forming a new government has increased the pressure on Iraqi parties. It is expected that a new round of negotiations will be held to accelerate the process after the Ramadan holidays. 

Turkish military operations in the KRI 

On 18 April, the Turkish army started its 'Operation Claw-Lock' in the Zap, Metina and Avashin regions against the PKK guerrillas. This operation builds on the Claw-Lighting and Claw-Thunderbolt operations that the Turkish army conducted in the KRI last year that targeted the same region. Before the commencement of the operation, these regions were heavily bombed by air and howitzer strikes, and the Turkish soldiers were air-dropped in specific locations. Clashes between the PKK guerrillas and Turkish soldiers have occurred since the operation began. So far, clashes have taken part in the area between 10 to 15 kilometres to the border, but Turkish media has been reporting that Turkish soldiers are expected to go around 50-60 kilometres deep into the KRI territory as part of the operation. Turkish President Erdogan has said that the military operation aims to 'cleanse the Zap area completely' and secure Turkey's border. President Erdogan also claimed that both the KRG and Iraqi government were assisting Turkey in the Claw-Lock operation, but Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement denying Erdogan’s claim. Several Iraqi politicians have declared their opposition to the operation and issued strongly worded statements.  

On 25 April, Turkey's Minister for National Defence, Hulusi Akar, Chief of Staff, General Yasar Guler, and the Commander of the Ground Forces, General Musa Avsever, visited the Turkey-Iraq border to observe the operation. Akar received a briefing on the latest situation on the ground at the Tactical Command Post and held a video conference call with the commanders of the troops participating in the operation. He claimed that the first stage of the operation was completed, and over the next few months, the operation will be extended to a broader region to realise all its objectives. On 26 April, the Turkish army released a statement that, in total, 9 Turkish soldiers lost their lives in the clashes with the PKK guerrillas. Many Kurdish villagers had to abandon their homes because of the Turkish airstrikes and the ongoing operations. 

On 26 April, the Security Council of the KRG announced that its forces had seized a ton of explosives, ten anti-tank missiles, 23 engines for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as 1,200 gas masks and 375 AK-47 magazines in the Duhok city. It claimed that the suspect captured as part of the operation informed the Kurdish authorities that the weapons were handed over to him by a YPG commander Rudi Huseyin and he was transporting them to the PKK guerrillas. Neither the PKK nor the YPG made any statements about the capture of the weapons, but news sources close to the PKK acknowledged that the Kurdish authorities had seized the gas masks. The PKK has been claiming that the Turkish army frequently uses poisonous gases in its operations against the PKK guerrillas.   

Looking forward: On 3 May, several clashes in the Sinjar region took place between the Iraqi army and YPS forces, and the early indications are such that the conflict will escalate in the coming weeks and months. The Iraqi military seems determined to root out the Yezidi forces and establish its control in the region. The KRG has been supporting the Iraqi government’s position and sees the Yezidi autonomous administration as an impediment to the region's security. 

Turkish army's operation will intensify in the coming months of the summer, and President Erdogan wants to use a victory against the PKK to increase his falling domestic support in the next election scheduled for June 2013. The region’s mountainous terrain makes it difficult for the Turkish army to make swift progress. However, Turkey’s extensive use of armed drones and other high-tech weaponry has been effective in containing the PKK attacks inside Turkey. 

The government formation process in Iraq is likely to be a difficult one, given the fragmentation of the Kurdish and Shia political blocs and the consolidation of two alliances, each of which has the power to block the formation of the government. The stalemate is likely to further erode the trust in the political system to resolve Iraq's deep-rooted and complex problems. 

Turkey

The Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)’s Armenian MP Garo Paylan became a target of Turkish nationalists after he submitted a draft bill for the recognition of the Armenian genocide and the removal of the names of the people responsible for the genocide from public buildings, squares and streets. MP Paylan has been vocal in his challenge of the state’s current policy on the genocide and had received threats in the past for his activities and speeches on the matter. On 24 April, the HDP released a statement to mark the 107th anniversary of the Armenian genocide and called for the government to adopt a peaceful approach to dealing with the demands of the Armenian community and improve Turkey’s political, commercial and cultural relations with Armenia. 

On 16 March, the police carried out early morning house raids in Diyarbakir, targeting the Kurdish women’s movement activists. Adalet Kaya, the Rosa Women's Association president and the former co-mayor of Sur district, Filiz Buluttekin, were detained in the raids. In total, 21 women were detained, and the Kurdish sources linked the detentions to the event held to celebrate International Women's Day on 8 March. 

On 18 April, the HDP denounced the new Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan under the pretext of fighting the PKK: “These attacks will not solve any problems of Turkey as they have done so far; on the contrary, it will deepen Turkey’s economic, political and social problems as it has been experienced for 40 years”. 

On 4 April, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) passed a law lowering the election threshold from 10% to 7%. The opposition parties objected to the law and argued that it aims to feed a lifeline to the declining MHP, the main ally of the AKP and President Erdogan. The law also reduces the advantages of being part of an electoral alliance by making it difficult for the smaller parties to get their candidates elected through the alliance and relying on the support of the bigger parties. Via this law, the government hopes to incentivise the minor opposition parties to go alone in the next election rather than act as part of the opposition Nation's Alliance. 

Two Kurdish inmates died after the torture of 60 guards at Silivri Prison. The family received Ferhan Yilmaz's body from Silivri State Hospital and buried it in their village of Örmegözü in Batman province on 12 April. The family wanted to get the preliminary autopsy report, but the authorities refused and claimed it would give them in 6 months. The families of the inmates failed in their efforts to receive information and autopsy reports from the authorities regarding what happened to their sons at Silivri Prison and believe that their children were murdered because there were visible signs of torture on the bodies.

The Republican People's Party (CHP) leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, visited the majority Kurdish city of Diyarbakir during the second week of March. He held meetings with civil society groups and political actors. On 11 March, Kilicdaroglu attended the "Tigris Talks" meeting organised by the Dicle Center for Social Research (DİTAM) and answered questions from representatives of non-governmental organisations in Diyarbakir and the heads of regional bar associations. Kilicdaroglu shared his views on the Kurdish issue, the failure to include the HDP in the opposition's alliance, the CHP's role in lifting the immunity of the Kurdish MPs, and education in the mother tongue. 

Newroz (Kurdish new year) celebrations

Hundreds of thousands of people celebrated Newroz in many provinces throughout Turkey. Singers performed, and HDP politicians delivered speeches in Newroz meetings across the country. Large crowds were noticed in predominantly Kurdish cities, Diyarbakir and Van. The celebrations were largely peaceful, and no significant incidence of police violence was noted, but there were hundreds of detentions during the celebrations. In Diyarbakir alone, 298 people were detained by the security forces, including around 100 minors. In the Bismil district of Diyarbakir province, 5-year-old twins were detained with their mother because of the symbols on their costumes. In Istanbul, 98 people were detained for shouting slogans or the symbols on their costumes. 

The HDP’s legal cases and arrests of its officials 

On 19 April, the HDP submitted its 220-page written defence in its closure case to the Constitutional Court. After the defence was submitted to the Supreme Court, Umit Dede, the HDP's Law and Human Rights Commission co-chairman, said the indictment was a political document, not a legal one. The HDP official argued, “In our defence of the merits, we went into detail and responded to each claim of the prosecutor one by one, revealing that this indictment was unlawfully issued and that it was a document prepared by the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court as a result of the ruling power and the coercion of its partners”. The HDP officials have long been claiming that their party became a target of President Erdogan because its success unsettled his grip on power, and the repression of the party is seen as the central element in President Erdogan’s plan to retain the presidency in 2023. On 31 March, 46 institutions from Europe and around the world released a statement about the closure case against the HDP and urged the Constitutional Court “to ensure that judicial proceedings take place in full compliance with domestic and international fair trial standards, including the principle of judicial independence and impartiality and the rights of the defence”.

Meanwhile, new hearings in the Kobani Case have taken place against the leading HDP officials. On 9 April, the Ankara Public Prosecutor's Office issued arrest warrants for 91 HDP members as part of the Kobani Investigation. Forty-six people were detained in house raids in 13 cities on 12 April, including the former secretary-general of Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality, Metin Rehber, and the HDP’s former Treasurer, Zeki Celik. The 11th hearing of the Kobani Case, in which 108 people are being tried, including the former HDP Co-Chairs Selahattin Demirtaş, Figen Yüksekdag and former lawmakers, took place on 8 April. Condemning the case's progress and the court's positions, the HDP calls the case a "conspiracy". After the hearing, Umit Dede, co-chairman of the HDP's Law and Human Rights Commission, issued a press release with lawyers for the Kobani Case. The lawyers argued that from the outset, the trial had repeatedly interfered with the case and that the government had been determining the court's position. The lawyers argue that the case is a political one - that there have been major unlawful acts in the court process and that the trial has become a means of revenge. The authorities also froze the assets of 90 people, mainly HDP politicians, as part of the ongoing case and investigation. 

On 2 April, Public Prosecutors in Ankara filed a new indictment for the HDP’s jailed former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, on charges of terrorism based on a social media post dating back to 2013. In the 28-page indictment, Demirtaş is accused of “disseminating propaganda for a terrorist organisation” in a tweet that allegedly praised the leader of the outlawed PKK on 16 November 2013.

On 20 April, an operation targeting mainly the Kurdish business community was initiated by the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor's Office. As part of this operation, several people, including HDP politicians and businessmen, were detained in morning raids in Diyarbakır, Adıyaman, Ankara, Çanakkale, Istanbul and Izmir. Among those detained were Necati Ricecioglu, former Co-Chairman of Diyarbakır Kayapınar Municipality, Ramazan Kartalmis and Marwan Yıldız, former Co-Chairs of Ergani Municipality, Tarik Yazgan, former provincial director of HDP Diyarbakır, and Celalettin Birtane, a vice chairman of the Board of Directors of the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Conflict dynamics

The Children of Fire Initiative (thought to be an affiliated group of the PKK) has conducted several sabotage actions targeting the businesses belonging to the government's supporters. These sabotage actions are carried out regularly and usually result in fire and material damage to the business premises of people close to the AKP or the MHP. On 21 April, a bomb attack took place in Bursa, which targeted the vehicle carrying the prison guards and resulted in the death of one guard and injury to seven others. An explosion targeted the office of the pro-government charity, the Turkey Youth Foundation, in Istanbul, causing material damage. Turkish authorities have blamed Turkish leftist groups that they linked to the PKK for carrying out both of the attacks. 

Looking forward: The widening of the Kobani Investigation and the new charges brought against the HDP officials are in line with the government's strategy to create a legal basis for the closure of the HDP. In many cases, the arrests are justified by secret witnesses’ testimony, and the courts do not sufficiently examine the evidence. The recent sentencing of Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala to life imprisonment and the sentencing of seven other activists to 18 years in the Gezi Park protests case on flimsy and mainly fabricated evidence indicates that the government will be using the legal instruments to further stifle civil society and the opposition. The verdict in the Gezi case also reveals the government's control of the judiciary and that it is prepared to use the legal system to repress political dissent in Turkey. Hence, the court finding the defendants in the Kobani case guilty of the crimes they are accused of would enable the government to press ahead with the HDP’s closure and ban the leading actors of the pro-Kurdish democratic movement. Such a scenario will aid the government in the election because the Kurdish voters will be unlikely to vote in the elections if the HDP is not participating. 

The military operations in the KRI will likely continue throughout the summer but judging by the Turkish army's track record against the PKK guerrillas in recent years, it is unlikely to realise all of its military objectives fully. The operations since 2016 have relied on armed drones and air power. They have succeeded in restricting the space the PKK operates, but the government is far from convincingly claiming that the PKK is wholly defeated. Suppose the Turkish army can clear the border regions with this operation. In that case, the next stage of the operation will probably target the PKK's main bases in the Qandil Mountains (Sulaymaniyah governorate) and a new and more comprehensive military operation against the Kurdish forces in Syria. 

Syria

There were several IS attacks in the AANES territory during the second half of April. AANES officials noted that since 17 April, at least 21 attacks have been carried out by IS, killing 24 people. On 27 April, an attack by IS near Abu Khashab, Deir Ez-Zor, killed seven people and wounded four. It is believed that the attack targeted Nuri al-Hamish, head of the Deir Ez-Zor Civil Council Public Relations Office, and his family. On 18 April, a bomb attack by IS targeted a car used by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and injured two fighters. 

Murders committed by IS in the al-Hol camp also continued. An Iraqi couple was killed in the al-Hol camp on 22 April, which brought the number of people murdered by IS from 19 April to eight. On 19 April, three women were found dead. A Syrian woman was shot in the head on 21 April. In addition, an Iraqi man was killed on 21 April. In March, a total of 19 sleeper cell attacks across AANES took place, killing five SDF fighters and injuring seven. The SDF carried out 21 raids, and over 200 suspects were arrested, with one IS member killed. 

On 14 April, General Michael Kurilla, the new commander of the US Central Command, visited Syria and held talks with Mazloum Abdi, the SDF commander. According to the SDF, General Kurilla “pledged to provide more support to secure the prisons containing ISIS elements”. On 16 March, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ethan Goldrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran Jennifer Gavito, and Director for Iraq and Syria at the National Security Council Zehra Bell travelled to the AANES and held separate meetings with Mazloum Abdi and Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) leader Ilham Ahmed, with the meetings mainly focusing on countering IS threats. 

Internal police guards have been posted outside the headquarters of the KDP-Syria in Qamishli. The KDP-S is affiliated with the KDP in Iraq, and several party offices were attacked or raided in AANES following the commencement of the Turkish military operation in Iraq. The Kurds perceive the KDP's actions in Iraq as supporting the Turkish operation against the PKK guerrillas.

Tensions between AANES and the Syrian government

Soldiers from the Fourth Division of the Syrian army have been blocking the shipment of medicines and some products to Aleppo's Sheikh Maksud and Ashrafiye neighbourhoods from 13 March onward. They have previously blocked the entry of fuel, flour and basic foodstuffs into the area. In response to the Damascus government's blockade, on 9 April, the SDF blocked the entrances and exits of areas controlled by the Syrian regime forces in the eastern cities of Hasakah and Qamishli. Local sources said regime forces and autonomous government officials held a meeting in Qamishli, mediated by Russian officers, to lift the blockade on Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo in exchange for an end to the siege on regime forces in Qamishli and Hasakah. The AANES security forces have closed all entrances and exits to the security zone where regime forces are stationed in the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah. From 16 April, Russian efforts to find a solution intensified, and on 28 April, both sides decided to lift the blockades. Syrian army allowed the entry of foodstuffs, fuel, medicine, and other needs of civilians into the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Aleppo. In return, AANES security forces removed roadblocks, opened the Qamishli Airport road, and withdrew to the previously agreed contact lines.

Escalation of Turkish attacks

There has been a marked escalation in the attacks by the Turkish army and Turkish-backed SNA targeting the AANES territory and its military forces. Manbij city and its countryside have been targeted by the Turkish military, with 55 mortar shells, five artillery strikes and five drone attacks taking place in April alone. Ain Issa and Tell Tamer were the other two towns targeted frequently with mortar fire and rockets. According to Rojava Information Centre, Turkey conducted 34 drone attacks against AANES in 2022, injuring 29 and killing nine people. On 22 April, the city of Kobani was hit with four howitzer shells, and the attack wounded two civilians. On 20 April, Turkey carried out a drone attack in Kobane, targeting the car carrying the fighters of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). The attack killed three YPJ fighters. On the same day, another Turkish drone attack targeted a house in Qamishli, but no casualties were reported.   

Human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians

Turkish-held areas of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) and Tel-Abyad, northern Syria, witnessed a state of security chaos and violations that claimed the lives of civilians and cases of killing, bulldozing of houses and rape during the third week of March. On 2 April, Turkish-backed militias arrested three more Kurds in the Jinderas and Rajo districts of Afrin. The militias frequently kidnap Kurds and release them after paying a ransom. On 27 March, the Hamzah Brigade, affiliated with the SNA, caused injury to eight children when its fighters fired randomly into a school while attempting to detain a teacher in Afrin's Maabatli village. 

 

Looking forward: The escalation of Turkey and the Turkish-backed NSA attacks will likely continue into the summer, and they could even turn into a more extensive ground military operation. Turkey has been using the crisis in Ukraine to improve its ties with the West and closed its airspace to Russian flights to and from Syria, which will likely weaken Russia’s ability to support the Syrian state. The Syrian state’s blockade of Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo reveals that the Syrian state continues to view the AANES as an adversary and is unwilling to accept a territorially and politically plural Syria. However, its ability to impose its authority in the AANES territory will be weakened the longer Russia’s war with Ukraine drags on. Overall, the AANES's security forces have proved effective in dealing with the threat posed by IS. The recent attacks show the group remains a threat to the AANES in Syria despite the efforts by the SDF and the international coalition to defeat it. IS will very likely exploit any security vacuum in the region to its advantage. 

Iran

Iranian authorities' arrest of Kurdish political activists continued in March and April. In March, at least 37 Kurds were arrested by the Iranian security forces on charges of political and civic activities. On April, 39 Kurds were arrested on charges of political and civil activities. Many of the arrests were connected with the Newroz celebrations, and those detained were accused of being the organisers of the events and activities or participating in them. Before the Newroz holidays, Iranian authorities imposed strict security measures to dissuade Kurds from celebrating Newroz with Kurdish music, dance, and the display of the symbols of Kurdish nationalism. 

In March, the trials of several political activists were concluded, with two receiving the death penalty and 20 receiving prison sentences. In April, a criminal court in Kamyaran sentenced four Kurdish men, Mala Mohammed, Mirza Rahmani, Sirwan Qurbani, and Burhan Kamangar, to three months in prison for attending the funeral of a Kurdish activist named Haider Qurbana. According to the statistics prepared by the Hengaw Human Rights Organization, which monitors the human rights violations in the Kurdish areas of Iran, in April 2022, four kolbars (couriers) were killed and 51 wounded, mainly by direct fire from the Iranian soldiers and border guards. Corresponding figures for March were two dead and 31 wounded.