Key Takeaways for the Period of April-May 2024 

-The debate over if or not the parliamentary elections in Iraqi Kurdistan able to be hold in June has been stirringup. One should not surprise that in case of failure to hold the election, Federal Court may bring up anothercontentious decision on the legitimacy of the Iraq Kurdistan’s caretaker government, such as restricting it’sauthorities or handing them partly or completely over to Nechirvan Barzani. However, if the elections takeplace, then, there are several scenario depending on whether KDP boycotts it or let it happen in Erbil andDuhok. Obviously, these options include the separation of the Iraq Kurdistan into two.

- The period of April-May 2024 would be marked as the period of important visits. Iraqi Prime MinisterMohammed Shia al-Sudani’s long-awaited visit to the US, Turkish president Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad andErbil after 12 years, PUK’s Bafel Talabani’s visit to Moscow and KDP’s Nechirvan Barzani’s visit to Iran worthmentioning as the pivotal visits of this period.

- On March 31 local election in Turkey, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) sufferedsignificant losses in local elections for the first time since 2002. Following Dem Party’s success in Turkey’sKurdish-majority southeast and Erdogan’s post-election messages embracing democracy, the question at handwas whether Turkey would resort to heavy-handed tactics in the name of so-called security considerations toseize mayoral offices held by Dem Party members by appointing trustees close to the AKP. The verdicts of theKobane trials clearly show that when it comes to Kurdish politics in Turkey, it seems unlikely for a‘normalization’ in the Kurdish question in Turkey.

- In mid-May, an Ankara court has sentenced former Democratic People’s Party (HDP) co-leaders SelahattinDemirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ to decades in prison in total in the Kobani Case, where 108 people are beingtried for terror charges, including “disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state.” Ankara 22nd HighCriminal Court sentenced Selahattin Demirtaş to 20 years in prison for aiding to disrupt the unity and integrityof the state, 4 years and 6 months for incitement to commit a crime, 2 years and 6 months for making propagandafor a terrorist organization, 1 year and 6 months for inciting people to disobey the law. Demirtaş was sentenced42 years in prison in total with other sentences. These harsh verdicts by the Turkish court clearly indicate thatthe debate over the normalization after Erdogan’s AKP’s defeat in the March 31 local elections does not coverthe Kurdish politics and the AKP government is still under the heavy grips of the ultra-nationalist MHP party.

IRAQ &The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG)

Political Dynamics

• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s long-awaited visit to Washington, DC, on April 15-19, started with a bang. Shortly prior to his arrival to the US capital, Iran and its proxies operating in Iraq, Syria,and Yemen launched a retaliatory strike targeting Israeli military facilities

Assessment: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s principal objective for his Washington visit was supposed to be to expand bilateral discussions beyond the military and security realms to particularly encompass issues such as education, finance, agriculture, economics, technology, and culture. But Iran’s launching of hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel last weekend brought to the fore two of the most complicated issues in the US-Iraqi bilateral relationship: the status of the US military presence and Baghdad’s ability to rein in local Iran-aligned militias. Baghdad is putting increased pressure on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and undercutting its institutional, economic, and political capacity to manage its own affairs. Erbil hopes that this will be a major topic of conversation during Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s visit to Washington. Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani visited the US capital in late February in part to emphasize this danger and center it in the Biden administration’s approach to Iraq. He left with assurances that Washington and Erbil remain partners but little to suggest that President Joe Biden will prioritize Barzani’s demands during the talks with Sudani.

There are a number of areas where Kurdish leaders would like to see Washington protect their interests, including the restart of oil exports, the continued presence of US troops, attacks by Iran, the role of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court in undermining Kurdish institutions, upcoming Kurdistan regional elections on June 10, and the federal budget. These topics would certainly be discussed during Sudani’s visit, but not always in a manner to Erbil’s liking. While the issues of oil, US troops, and Iran all have a Kurdish dimension, they fundamentally involve larger interests and players. Washington has its own concerns to address first, and Kurdish demands will be lower down its list of priorities. The role of the court and the upcoming elections are essentially internal matters. Biden may raise them with Sudani, but he is unlikely to press hard when doing so. Although the budget could have been a pressure point, the Iraqi leader lowered the temperature by paying the salaries of Kurdish public servants before Eid al-Fitr.

• Turkish President Erdogan’s historic visit to Iraq and the Kurdish-populated north after 12 years

In April 22-24, Turkish president Erdogan visited Baghdad and Erbil after 12 years.

Erdogan's Baghdad visit appears to have failed to progress the issue of resuming KRG oil exports. The Iraq government insists KRG oil companies must deal directly with the Iraqi Oil Ministry and remains unwilling to set a date for KRG oil export resumption until this matter is resolved.

The signing of a quadrilateral agreement among Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE for the Development Road project, aiming to connect the Gulf with Europe via Turkey and Iraq. Despite passing through the Kurdistan Region, no KR city is integrated into the planned transportation corridor.

One should also note that, aside from Nechirvan Barzani, Masrour Barzani, Deputy PM Qubad Talabani from the PUK, and several ministers from the PUK and Gorran were also present at the airport to welcome Erdogan. Turkey has accused the PUK of cooperating with the PKK and has banned flights from Sulaimani Airport for more than a year. The key meeting was that closed-door meeting with KDP President Masoud Barzani, where critical issues such as the PKK and oil will be discussed. Subsequently, Erdogan was scheduled for a more ceremonial gathering attended by the Kurdistan Region's President, Prime Minister & his deputy, and other ministers. He was also slated to meet with Turkmen representatives before departing for Turkey at midnight.

It is also worth mentioning that despite being small and symbolic, several Arab activists protested against Erdogan for what they call 'killing innocent people’ in Baghdad. However, no protests were allowed in the Kurdistan Region, and an attempted protest in Sulaimani was suppressed, sparking a debate on social media about the reasons behind this discrepancy.

Decoding Erdogan's Erbil Visit and Its Potential Outcomes

1. Erdogan's visit to Erbil underscores the depth of Turkey's relations with the KDP. Erdogan enjoys a strong rapport with the Barzani family, particularly has good chemistry with Nechirvan and, to a lesser extent, Masrour. While Erdogan could have bypassed Erbil, his decision to visit during a sensitive period, as the regional government faces massive pressure from Baghdad, can be interpreted as a show of support for the KRG. This is significant because Turkey, as a regional powerhouse, possesses substantial tools to influence developments in Iraq, especially in the context of Kurdistan.

Erdogan and Barzani had a straightforward deal: oil for security. Erdogan allowed the KRG to export oil in exchange for unprecedented KDP cooperation in the war against the PKK and permitting deeper Turkish penetration in Kurdistan. In return, Erdogan provided the KDP with a channel to sell Kurdistan's oil, granting it unparalleled leverage against Baghdad. Although Turkey has benefited from a very generous economic agreement, the key focus for Turkey has been the PKK, given that it is the country's most critical national security issue in recent decades.

However, this dynamic has upset since last year, as KRG oil no longer flows to Turkey's Ceyhan port. Erdogan's regional foreign policy pivot towards economic development rather than hard geopolitical goals may also indicate that he is unwilling to completely sacrifice the economic opportunities in the other 16 Iraqi provinces for the sake of just two provinces, especially with the Development Road project, which can further cement Turkey's role as the hub where all continental routes connecting Europe with Asia converge.

1. With this contextual background established, two factors in the coming weeks will determine what Erdogan has agreed upon in Baghdad and how it will impact Erbil and the future of the Kurdistan Region. Given that the meeting with Masoud Barzani was behind closed doors and no information is available regarding the content, developments in the following weeks will clarify what has been discussed based on these two factors:
2. a) Oil Exports: The readiness of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is a crucial consideration. If exports resume via this pipeline, it will be a positive development for Baghdad, as the Iraqi government desperately needs to restart oil exports from Kirkuk to generate revenue. However, this puts additional pressure on the KRG to hand over 400 barrels of oil to be transported via the Kirkuk pipeline, as stipulated in the budget agreement for the continuation of salary payments from Baghdad to the KRG. If this occurs, it could spell the end of the KRG's oil pipeline, which has been a symbol of the region's economic potential and has elevated the KRG's status in the global energy market, translating into geopolitical influence.
3. b) Military Operations Against the PKK: The scope and extent of military operations against the PKK and the level of support Turkey receives from Baghdad and Erbil will signify the nature and extent of agreement with the two parties. Erdogan is determined to address the PKK issue in Iraq, viewing the perceived eradication of the group as his lasting legacy, regardless of the outcome. This matter is directly tied to the future of Development Road project and will have far-reaching implications for the region.

The outcomes of these two factors will shape the agreements reached between Erdogan, Baghdad, and Erbil, and will have a major impact on the future of the Kurdistan Region.

• The debate over if or not the parliamentary elections in Iraqi Kurdistan able to be hold in June has been stirring up. One should not surprise that in case of failure to hold the election, Federal Court may bring up another contentious decision on the legitimacy of the Iraq Kurdistan’s caretaker government, such as restricting it’s authorities or handing them partly or completely over to Nechirvan Barzani. However, if the elections take place, then, there are several scenario depending on whether KDP boycotts it or let it happen in Erbil and Duhok. Obviously, these options include the separation of the Iraq Kurdistan into two. According to the Bwar News website, since the KDP’s expectation for the Iraqi election commission to suspend operations for Kurdistan elections due to their boycott did not materialize, their current plan is as follows: If negotiations fail to yield an agreement, they will instruct their members, who comprise a majority of polling station managers in Duhok and Erbil, to collectively boycott the stations, thereby paralyzing the electoral process.

In Iraq’s prime minister Al-Sudani’s visit to Washington DC, US president Biden has called for "free, fair, and transparent regional elections" in the Kurdistan Region. Al-Sudani-Biden joint statement also expressed a "desire to reopen the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline." However, overall there is little KRG-specific emphasis in the joint statement presented below.

• On March 29, The PUK President Bafel Talabani visited Moscow for some high level meetings. The PUK President met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during his first trip to Russia since assuming the party's leadership. Since the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum in 2017, Russia has steadily expanded its foothold there, particularly in the oil sector.

Russia's Rosneft now owns a 60 percent stake in the Kurdistan oil pipeline, which runs from the Khurmala field to the FyshKhabur border crossing. Notably, the PUK-controlled area contains most of the Kurdistan Region's natural gas reserves - an increasingly vital commodity in the global geo-economic landscape following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

According to the official statement, Bafel Talabani conveyed to the Russian Foreign Minister: "The sovereignty of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region must be safeguarded, and our country should not become an arena to settle disputes." For his part, Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's commitment to "lasting peace in the region through a policy of non-interference in Iraq's internal affairs and respect for its sovereignty." Talabani's Moscow visit comes on the heels of recent trips to Washington by KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the KDP's deputy leader, underscoring the diverging international alignments of the two major Kurdish parties.

Assessment: According to the pro-PUK Kurdish media, PUK leader Bafel Talabani's visit to Russia aims to seek Russian assistance in normalizing the party's relations with Turkey and lifting the air embargo on Sulaimani airport. The website suggests the party seeks to leverage Moscow's good relations with Ankara to facilitate the normalization process. The PUK is convinced that Russian officials can play an influential role in this matter and hopes to persuade Turkish authorities to initiate dialogue and normalize relations. Furthermore, the reports indicate that all the meetings of the PUK delegation in Russia were organized by a Russian investor with strong connections to officials in both Russia and Turkey.

• On April 4, Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani met with Major General Joel B. Vowell, Commander of the US-led forces in Iraq and Syria, to discuss the progress in the Peshmerga unification efforts. The Peshmerga Minister, Shorsh Ismail, was also present at the meeting.

Assessment: The Peshmerga unification process has seen little to no advancement, prompting the US to threaten to cut aid allocated to the Peshmerga Ministry. The US has already reduced its aid from $25 million to $20 million, and it is expected to be further decreased to $15 million in the near future.

• As the Iraqi Kurdish dissent over the Israel’s ongoing military operation in Gaza has been growing in the KRG-controlled areas, the Kurdish Islamist organizations have been pioneering the anti-Israel and pro-Palestine protests and charity campaigns. While the the KDP and the other Kurdish ruling parties have remained largely muted on the conflict in Gaza due to their pro-Israel stance, the Kurdish Islamic groups have been proactively vocal in their support for the Palestinian side, dispatching substantial humanitarian aid. For instance, in the Iraqi Kurdish Islamist media, there are many videos going viral from Gaza showing gratitude being expressed to a Kurdish Islamist charitable organization for providing food and assistance to over 1000 families. The speakers thank 'the great Kurdish nation,' as he says, for their solidarity and support.
• On May 6, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani travelled to Tehran in an official visit to discuss regional developments with senior Iranian officials, in his fifth trip to the Islamic republic in ten years. Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani paid a visit to Tehran, engaging in discussions with top Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, with the objective of “enhancing relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran across various domains.” Given Iran’s military actions against the Kurdistan Region and its support for Baghdad’s anti-Kurdish policies, Barzani’s visit was seen as a move to address these concerns through dialogue with Iranian leaders. “During his visit to Tehran, President Nechirvan Barzani will participate in discussions with senior officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at strengthening relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, while also examining potential areas for cooperation,” the Kurdistan Region Presidency said in a statement.

“The meetings will also address current regional developments,” it added, and Barzani will be accompanied by senior Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials including Interior Minister Reber Ahmed.

The trip comes days after Barzani visited Baghdad for discussions with Iraqi officials on paying the salaries of the Kurdistan Region’s civil servants and upcoming parliamentary elections.

Explainer: Why Nechirvan Barzani is Visiting Iran and What to Expect from the Visit?

In the past, KDP officials at various levels have demonstrated that the decisions of the Iraqi Federal Court over the past two years, from the repeal of the Kurdistan oil and gas law to the annulment of the Kurdistan parliament's electoral law, as well as the bombing of Erbil by the Revolutionary Guards and Iraqi militias, culminating in Iranian ballistic missile attacks on January 15th, were complementary. The aim was to subjugate the KDP and abort the legal and constitutional powers of the Kurdistan Region, emphasizing that Erbil alone in Iraq has not submitted to Iranian policies, hence the targeting.

Masoud Barzani of the KDP has stated on several occasions his desire to open a new chapter in relations with Iran and improve ties at all levels. The KDP may have concluded that direct negotiations with Iran, rather than its allies in Iraq, is the best solution to remove obstacles and open blind spots.

As the leading political force in power in the Kurdistan Region, the KDP, both as a party and a governing entity, is in dire need of Iranian intervention at this stage to ease the pressure from Shiite forces, challenge the string of Federal Court rulings, and exert pressure on the PUK and other Kurdish forces to overcome the complicated situation caused by the KDP's election boycott and the underlying reasons behind it.

Despite Nechirvan Barzani's uneven situation as the President of the Kurdistan Region, leading an institution that supposed to bring together all political forces and facing great embarrassment if he unilaterally postpones the elections, the Kurdish representation in the Iraqi parliament presents a challenge. Around 55% or 33 seats are in favor of holding elections on time, while the KDP alone, with 31 seats or around 45%, wants the elections postponed.

Another obstacle facing Barzani is the fear of the PUK and other parties' next steps in case of a parliamentary election postponement. One expected possibility is a summons by Kurdish factions to the Iraqi parliament. Additionally, several Kurdish factions are preparing to file complaints in the Federal Court, both strong possibilities.

Other risks facing the KRG include the PUK's potential withdrawal from the cabinet, demands for the dissolution of the KRG cabinet and the formation of a transitional government to pave the way for elections, and a strong insistence on holding elections on time. There is also the likelihood of a complete split between the KDP and PUK zones, as there is no guarantee of elections even if delayed for a couple of months, since the KDP states they will not participate unless the court rectifies its ruling on the electoral law, including the multidistrict nature of the elections and the removal of quota seats.

While it is unclear what Iran's response would be to the KDP's demands and whether they can turn a new page, two factors are clear: 1) The KDP cannot strategically get too close to Iran, like the PUK, given the geography of areas under KDP control, which has a strong economic and military influence from Turkey. 2) The KDP's assumptions about the extent of Iran's influence over the Federal Court might be misleading, as while the court is influenced by Iran, it is not under the country's control, and many judges, including the head of the court, have a strong Iraqi nationalist sentiment that diverts them from strictly aligning with pro-Iran militias or religious groups influenced by Iran's Islamic regime.

Overall Assessment: In less than a month, Kurdish leaders have held meetings with Erdogan concerning Baghdad-Erbil relations and now with Iran's top leadership, including the Supreme Leader. As regional powerhouses, Iran and Turkey wield the most influence over the Kurds, aside from the US. The coming weeks will reveal the extent of their respective influences. However, our assessment is that it will expose the limits of their sway, as the issue with Baghdad is likely to persist.

• On May 17, the media war between the KDP and PUK over the PKK presence in Sulaimani continues. In response to the PUK spokesperson's accusations of the KDP encouraging Turkish attacks on Sulaimani, KDP-affiliated media, including BasNews, which is linked to the KDP's intelligence wing, has published an interview with Mahmoud Rash, a former PKK commander, who made several allegations about PKK activities in Sulaimani. It is important to note that while ex-PKK commanders who join the KDP often exaggerate and sometimes fabricate information, the concrete nature of the allegations in this case warrants publication, as it provides insight into the increasingly hostile nature of the information warfare between the two parties.

According to Rash, the PUK has been assisting the PKK by:

1. Establishing more than 18 well-funded PKK-affiliated organizations with offices in Sulaimani.

Allowing PKK commanders to operate in Sulaimani, with some collecting financial aid. He cited an incident where Turkish aircraft killed three senior PKK commanders in the Azmar mountains near the city, questioning how they entered the city and who provided information to Turkey.

1. Allocating coalition helicopters for PKK leaders in Sulaimani, with one being shot down in Duhok in 2022.
2. PUK commanders allegedly facilitated the transport of girls and children to Kandil by bus, with specific commanders (initials S.G. and suffix Hawari) involved.

Rash further claimed that the PKK has military activities in various regions, including Sulaimani, Kafri, Khornawazan, Garmian, Sharbazher, Siamewa in Pejween, and Raperin. He noted that a commander of the PUK's 70th unit was killed by the PKK in Raperin without any response from the PUK. Additionally, he stated that 48 senior PKK leaders and 90 cadres have been killed in Sulaimani over the past four years several Turkmen officials have also been assassinated in return. Rash accused the PUK of allowing this conflict, questioning why it is concerned now. He also alleged that the PKK frequently buys and sells cars in Sulaimani to avoid detection, citing an incident where a civilian unknowingly bought a car previously driven by a PKK commander, which was later targeted by Turkey.

• Analysis: Inside the Numbers: Kurdish Region's Refugee and IDP Statistics

The KRG states that more than 900,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees reside within the Kurdistan Region, incurring an annual expenditure of $842 million.

According to the Joint Crisis Coordination Center, there are 900,467 displaced people in the Kurdistan Region, of which 631,174 are IDPs.

The KRG's data indicates that there are 269,293 refugees in the Kurdistan Region, comprising:

251,475 Syrian refugees

7,796 Turkish refugees

8,357 Iranian refugees

652 Palestinian refugees

1,130 refugees of other nationalities

Approximately 30% of the total refugee and IDP population live in camps, while 70% reside outside of camp settings. The Iraqi refugee and IDP affairs body has set a deadline of July to close all IDP camps in the Kurdistan Region, the majority of which host Yazidi IDPs in Duhok. There are around 110,000 displaced Iraqi families in the Kurdistan Region. The region hosts 33 camps, with 41% of the refugees and IDPs located in Erbil, 40% in Duhok, and 19% in Sulaimani.

Official figures as of December 2023 indicate that only 4,410 refugees and IDPs have voluntarily repatriated to their areas or home countries, including 1,944 IDPs and 2,977 refugees.

The KRG's daily expenditure for providing services to refugees stands at $2.3 per person, amounting to an annual cost of $842 million for the approximate population of one million displaced individuals.

• On April 22, The US State Department Human Rights Practices report1 for 2023 was published. The report concludes that ‘The human rights situation worsened during the year due to increased federal and Kurdistan Regional Government restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space.’
• On May 13, The Iraqi government has formally requested the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to depart by the end of 2025. The UN peacekeeping operation was established in 2003, shortly after the American invasion concluded. UNAMI has played a significant role in attempting to mediate between the KDP and PUK, as well as between Erbil and Baghdad.
• On May 11, the 26-year-old son of KR President Nechirvan Barzani, forcibly removed the manager of RT Bank, Humaila Gardi. RT Bank is reportedly co-owned by Nechirvan Barzani, his son Idris as well as Masrour Barzani, and his son, Areen. Humaila Gardi is said to be close to Masrour Barzani. RT Bank is one of the key institutions participating in the KRG-led MyAccount service for distributing public employee salaries. The reason behind Gardi's removal remains unknown, but reports suggest Idris had long sought her dismissal, potentially due to her closeness to the Masrour Barzani camp, though some reports allege her involvement in large-scale gold embezzlement. Idris Barzani has now appointed someone close to him as the bank's new manager.

Assessment: This incident highlights the limitations of established media outlets in the Kurdistan Region: RT Bank manager Humaila Gardi (pictured) has been forcibly removed and is reportedly under house arrest. However, no established media, including Rudaw, can report on it because the perpetrator is said to be Idris Barzani, the son of Rudaw's owner. Since RT Bank is one of the largest banks in the region, many people deal with it, making this news highly relevant. This case exemplifies the boundaries drawn for such media, where they are permitted to report on some mild topics deemed critical of the KRG, but a red line exists when it comes to certain powerful individuals who should be subject to the highest level of media scrutiny given their outsized power and wealth.

• On May 12, Iraqi Planning Ministry announced the population of The Kurdistan Region's Population as

of 2023.

The total population stands at: 6,003,554.

- Sulaimani: 2,320,434 people (38.7%).

- Erbil: 2,097,205 people (34.9%).

- Duhok: 1,461,457 people (24.3%).

- Halabja: 124,458 people (2.1%).

Assessment: this data differs from the estimates of Kurdistan Population put forward by the KRG which estimates that the KRG's population is higher by several hundred thousand, but this data is more important because if the Kurdistan elections take place, this population data will be used for each province's seat distribution.

• After the death of Iran’s president Raisi on May 19, It is noteworthy that PUK’s Bafel Talabani attended the funeral of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and co in Tehran today as part of the Iraqi president's delegation, which included several other Iraqi party leaders. This decision comes after the Kurdistan delegation, consisting of Nechirvan Barzani, Masrour Barzani, and Qubad Talabani, had already visited Tehran two days prior. Some unconfirmed reports suggest that Masrour Barzani strongly opposed Bafel Talabani's participation in the Kurdistan delegation, citing the reason that the delegation should only comprise official government representatives.

Conflict Dynamics

• While media reports suggest one Iranian missile wreckage from Iran's drone and missile attack on Israel on April 15 was found in Erbil, Kurdish security forces have identified remnants from at least two Iranian missiles: one just outside Erbil in the Malla Omer area, and another in Rawanduz, northeast of Erbil. However, two points are noteworthy:

1. These are likely remnants of cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles, as ballistic missiles exit and re-enter the atmosphere during their terminal phase.
2. While US air defenses were highly active, and we have evidence of their engagement to intercept several drones, it is not entirely clear whether these missiles were shot down or experienced in-flight malfunctions since the fuselages are largely intact. However, it is possible they were intercepted by the US Patriot Systems located in the Erbil airbase.

• According to the report published by the Christian Peacemaker Team (CPT), Turkish forces carried out 1,548 attacks and bombings against the PKK in the Kurdistan Region and Nineveh province in 2023.

The breakdown includes:

• 1,159 airstrikes
• 228 drone attacks
• 114 artillery attacks
• 3 shooting attacks
• 2 landmine attacks.

The Turkish attacks against the PKK in the Kurdistan Region (and wider northern Iraq) in 2023 by province:

• 475 in Erbil
• 517 in Duhok
• 420 in Sulaimani
• 36 in Nineveh (mostly Sinjar but also Makhmour).

• On April 26, Kormor gas field in the KRG controlled Kurdish north was hit by a Kamikaze drone attack. The KRG now confirms that four workers, Yemeni nationals, have been killed in the drone attack. This represents a significant escalation and marks the first fatal incident resulting from the drone strikes on the field.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said the attack halted the provision of gas to Iraqi Kurdistan’s power plants and reduced the region’s electricity supply by approximately 2,500 megawatts. On Sunday, Dana Gas temporarily suspended production at Khor Mor due to concerns about its workers’ safety.

Two days prior, gas tankers en route from Sulaimani to Erbil and Duhok were obstructed, with a KDP official claiming the blockade was '100% political.' However, the tankers have since been permitted to proceed. Moreover, a week ago, the Iraqi energy minister announced the signing of an agreement with the company operating Kormor, albeit with the dispute persisting with the KDP. Reports suggest that while the PUK advocates for gas exports to Kirkuk, the KDP favors exporting the gas to Turkey.

Map of the Kormor gas field, situated in the Qadir Karam sub-district of the Chamchamal district, nestled between Sulaimani and Kirkuk. As shown, it lies in close proximity to territories under Iraqi control and the Daquq district, which hosts a substantial presence of Hashd al-Shaabi forces, particularly Turkmen Shia militias.

Please see below the map of the oil and natural gas fields and associated natural gas infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region:

Analysis: What to make of the significant attack on the Kormor natural gas field?

One may briefly lay out the scenarios and dynamics around the geopolitics of natural gas in Kurdistan following yesterday's kamikaze drone attack on the Kormor Gas Field:

1. Iran Scenario: Iran emerges as the most probable culprit, though its actions represent a bold move that could further strain its relationship with the Iraqi government over energy security concerns. Here's why Iran is the likeliest perpetrator:
2. A) Iran stands to lose the most from the gas field's expansion; during the Iraqi PM's visit, a key agenda item was finding alternatives to Iraq's reliance on Iranian gas exports for electricity generation, as the US seeks to tighten sanctions further following the confrontation with Israel. For Iran, this is a major concern because not only will it result in a significant loss of revenue amid severe economic sanctions, but it will also deprive Iran of a major source of influence over the Iraqi government. While some have assumed Iran's influence in Iraq is a given, this is far from the truth. Although Iran exerts direct control over some militias like the Hezbollah Brigades, its relations with many other Shia elements are more complex. It is likely that once Iran regains some influence, Iraq will emerge as a power in its own right, as it has historically been, especially now with a population nearing 50 million, coupled with vast natural resources and capable human resources. It is highly unlikely that such a large country with huge potential would continue being a mere proxy in Iran's regional ambitions. Thus, Iran must continually find ways to create obstacles that deter Iraq from pursuing this path.
3. B) Turkish President Erdogan's visit to Baghdad was another significant development that further diversified Iraq's economic and political tools, as the two countries signed crucial agreements encompassing energy and economic frontiers such as the Development Road project. Such initiatives can further undermine Iran's geopolitical standing while simultaneously propelling Iraq toward greater independence as a regional actor.
4. C) Previous attacks on the field originated from an area that is a grey area between the Hashd and Peshmarga (1). Moreover, with parts of the drone recovered, it may be easier to identify the perpetrators.
5. KDP and Turkey Scenario: While less likely, this scenario merits consideration for the following reasons:
6. A) The attack occurred shortly after the Iraqi oil minister said in an interview with the US-funded al-Hurra TV that an agreement with the field operator to extend gas supply to Kirkuk, with infrastructure preparations finalized but that the KRG (meaning KDP) is against the gas delivery.
7. B) Four days ago, a PUK checkpoint halted gas trucks destined for Erbil and Duhok, potentially signaling the PUK's capability to cripple the gas supply to KDP-controlled areas as leverage in the Kirkuk gas delivery dispute. A senior KDP official described the incident as "100% political" to Rudaw TV. Thus, if this was indeed a message from the PUK to exert pressure on the KDP, it could be aimed at ensuring the KRG's acquiescence to the extension of Kormor gas to Kirkuk. It is crucial to understand that this unfolds in the wake of Erdogan's visit to Baghdad and Erbil. While the specifics of gas discussions in Baghdad and the closed-door meeting with Masoud Barzani in Erbil remain unknown, Erdogan explicitly stated prior to his visit that natural gas would be a key item on the agenda in Baghdad. The PUK is widely understood to vehemently oppose exporting gas to Turkey for reasons previously outlined. Consequently, if the US grants approval for gas exports to Iraq via Kirkuk, it is likely to materialize. In such a scenario, the KDP and Turkey may attempt to obstruct the process, especially since an attack could be more easily attributed to Iran, the party logically standing to lose the most.
8. D) Now, if this less likely scenario proves accurate, do they possess the logistical capability to strike such a field in that location? Yes. While suicide drones have a significantly shorter range compared to the most advanced variants, this particular drone appears to have carried a substantially larger payload, accounting for the extent of devastation. However, the drone must have been launched from a proximate area. We must bear in mind that the KDP has been heavily investing resources to secure the allegiance of individuals in the Chamchamal areas, which fall under PUK control. Moreover, Turkey has been actively building its presence in Kirkuk, especially considering the Iraqi-controlled region near the gas field harbors a sizable Turkmen population, many of whom are Shia - some potentially sympathetic to Turkey.
9. Iran-PUK Cooperation Scenario: Although least likely, this possibility cannot be dismissed. While the gas field is under PUK control, it is unclear what transpired during the Iraqi PM's meeting with Biden and Erdogan's visit. If there has been a push to initiate exporting some of the gas to Turkey, especially en route to Europe, as Europe desperately needs to find alternative sources to replace Russian natural gas, such a scenario would again grant the KDP more influence at the expense of the PUK at the local level. The PUK has long been averse to exporting natural gas to Turkey, preferring instead to export to the rest of Iraq. Now, while Iran would not want the gas sent to Iraq either for the reasons outlined in scenario 1, they share a common interest in obstructing it with the PUK. We must also bear in mind that PUK leader Bafel Talabani has recently visited Moscow and met with Russian officials. Russia has a clear incentive to attempt to block gas exports if any agreements were reached during the Biden or Erdogan meetings to extend them to Europe via Turkey.

Undoubtedly, the coming days will shed more light on the culprits behind this attack. Regardless, this marks a new era in Kurdistan's energy resources, as the region's natural gas reserves are emerging as an increasingly pivotal geopolitical asset, with local, regional, and global powers vying for influence over the region's increasingly significant natural gas reserves.

• In April 2024, the reports/rumors about Turkey’s anticipated military operation against the PKK targets in northern Iraq on establishing a 40km-deep security zone within Iraqi territory from the Turkish border to counter the PKK. continued to appear in Turkish and İraqi media outlets.

If applied to the entire border area, as suggested, it would encompass a substantial portion of the Kurdistan Region's territory, including over 90% of Duhok province, 25% of Erbil province, and sections of Nineveh province, as clarified in the accompanying map.

It seems improbable that Turkey would be permitted to construct such an extensive security zone with the depth and breadth mentioned. Additionally, parts of the Qandil mountain range, which Turkey aims to target, extend beyond the proposed 40km boundary from the Turkish border.

• On April 30, President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani met several Iraqi officials in Baghdad, including Iraqi President Latif Rashid, Prime MinisterMohammed Shia al Sudani, and acting Speaker of the Council of Representatives Mohsen al Mandalawi. According to several statements from Barzani’s office, the meetings addressed numerous ongoing issues between Baghdad and Erbil, most notably a tentative agreement for Baghdad to provide funds for the salaries of public employees in Iraqi Kurdistan. Barzani and al Sudani stressed “the significance of strengthening relations between Erbil and Baghdad and emphasized the need for continued backing from all Iraqi political parties.”

Iraq’s pro-Iran parties, mostly those from the Coordination Framework, responded to U.S. condemnation of an amendment to Iraq’s anti-prostitution law that was passed by the Council of Representatives bycollecting over 61 signatures on a petition demanding the expulsion of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski. Iraq’s antiprostitution law was passed in 1988, but Saturday’s amendment imposes harsh penalties for homosexuality, gender transition surgery, intentional practice of effeminacy, and promoting “sexual deviancy.”

• On May 12, The Iraqi government in Baghdad has constructed a 45-kilometer border wall with Syria in the Sinjar area in west Nineveh province. This is part of a much larger wall being built along various sections of the Iraqi-Syrian border. The Iraqi government has cited security concerns and preventing drug smuggling as the primary reasons behind this initiative. However, in the Sinjar region, the border wall may also hinder the coordination efforts of pro-PKK groups active in Sinjar and on the Syrian side of the border.
• On May 24, it was announced by the KRG’s Peshmerga ministry that After three years in the making, two joint Iraqi army-Peshmerga brigades are finally set to commence joint deployment in the disputed areas 'next week', according to the KRG representative in the joint operation force. Each of the two joint brigades consists of 3,500 soldiers, comprising both Peshmerga and Iraqi army personnel. These brigades are slated to be deployed in the gray areas between the Iraqi army and Peshmerga-controlled territories, which are reportedly often exploited by ISIS in Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. According to data from the Ministry of Peshmerga, there are 560 kilometers of security gaps between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi forces.

Economic Dynamics

• In his critical visit to Washington DC, One thorny topic that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia

on April 17, Iraq Prime Minister al-Sudani will be forced to tackle head on in Washington is his government’s inability to resolve outstanding disputes with the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan over the March 2023 stoppage of oil exports to Turkey, which has harmed American business interests. But Sudani can perhaps show progress on diversifying energy imports, which are currently dominated by Iranian natural gas and electricity: Iraq has started electricity imports from Jordan, is expected to receive electricity supplies from the Gulf, ratified long-delayed gas development contracts, will explore for gas in its western desert, plans to develop an LNG import facility, and is even tapping Turkmenistan for gas.

• On March 30, Eight U.S. Republican lawmakers submitted a letter to President Joe Biden that urged him to require Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to allow the resumption of Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil exports via Turkey. The letter expressed “deep concern” over the Biden administration’s plan to host al Sudani at the White House on April 15. The lawmakers also demanded the Biden administration halt the transfer of U.S. dollars to Iraq until the Department of the Treasury certifies such transfers do not benefit Iran or its proxies.
• On April 3, According to Iraqi Kurdish media, Erbil and Baghdad have reached a temporary agreement to ensure timely payment of salaries for the KRG employees and security forces until the salary digitization issue is resolved. Furthermore, the salaries of security forces and Peshmerga will be paid monthly using biometric codes (initials rather than full names), employing the same mechanism as the February salaries.

Assessment: Given the trajectory and magnitude of the issues, today's agreement is likely a temporary measure, designed as a precursor to the Iraqi Prime Minister's meeting with President Biden on April 15th. However, the agreement's sustainability is questionable, as the driving forces behind these issues extend beyond the Iraqi Prime Minister's authority. Additionally, the agreement appears to be a temporary and superficial solution, rather than addressing the substantive issues between Erbil and Baghdad.

• As of April 21, Iraq's Kirkuk-Turkey pipeline has completed testing and will be ready to resume exporting Kirkuk oil to Turkey as early as May 1st per Iraqi government amidst Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad and Erbil tomorrow. It remains unclear what will happen to the KRG's oil pipeline, as Kirkuk oil will no longer need to be transported via the KRG's pipeline to the Turkish border. This development may indicate the resumption of Kirkuk oil exports before that of the KRG's. However, some reports suggest that Iraq aims to also send KRG oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, potentially rendering the KRG's pipeline redundant. The KRG's pipeline is currently 60% owned by Russia's Rosneft and 40% by the KAR Group.

It is also worth noting that, on May 24, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt met with officials in Baghdad and Erbil to discuss “resuming Iraq’s oil exports via the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline (ITP).” The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) welcomed Pyatt’s visit and expressed a readiness to resume Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil exports if an agreement is reached between Baghdad and Erbil that “provides for payment surety for past and future exports and preservation of commercial and economic terms.” The APIKUR also stated Iraq has lost nearly 14 billion dollars since the halt of oil exports through Turkey in March 2023.

Analysis: the KRG Gas Exports to Fuel Further KDP-PUK Power Struggle

The Iraqi Oil Minister stated that they have finalized an agreement with the Crescent company, and the natural gas pipeline from the Kormor field in Chamchamal (PUK-controlled area in Sulaimani) to Kirkuk is complete, allowing for the import of 100 million cubic feet of gas. However, he mentioned a dispute between the company and the KRG authorities over the gas delivery.

Interestingly, previous reports indicated that the PUK had unilaterally agreed to export the gas to Iraqi government facilities in Kirkuk, while the KDP opposed this move, preferring to send the gas through its territory to Turkey instead. The PUK has reportedly blocked efforts to extend the gas pipeline to Duhok, fearing it could lead to an extension to the Turkish border, which would grant the KDP substantial power similar to its control over oil exports, despite the natural gas resources being largely in PUK territory.

The U.S. factor is crucial, as the Iraqi PM stated they would end dependence on Iranian gas by the end of the year, and the Iraqi Oil Minister said Kormor gas would be 30% cheaper for Iraq than imported Iranian gas. The U.S. may have given the green light for the gas to be sent to Kirkuk.

Notably, Erdogan also mentioned natural gas, largely in PUK territory, as an agenda item, despite Turkey viewing the PUK as a PKK collaborator and blocking Sulaimani airport from flights to or through Turkish airspace.

It is important to note that natural resources have been at the backbone of the KDP's dominance in the Kurdistan Region since the civil war in the 1990s. One of the key reasons for that civil war was the KDP's ability to smuggle Saddam's oil to Turkey, a lucrative revenue source that the PUK lacked, granting the KDP huge revenues and influence. A similar situation arose in the 2010s with the KRG oil pipeline, but Bafel Talabani of the PUK appears serious about finding alternative ways to counter the KDP's monopoly over natural resources. If the PUK succeeds in exporting gas independently, it could help rebalance some of the power it has lost relative to the KDP.

• Brief: Uncovering the Companies Involved in Kurdistan's Illicit Oil Trade with Iran and Turkey

Here below some interesting points taken from a report, published in Kurdish by Erbil's Bwar News website, exposes the major players and staggering profits involved in smuggling crude oil from the Kurdistan Region to Iran and Turkey.

For months, four companies have been illicitly transporting over 700 tankers laden with 160,000 barrels of crude daily across borders into these neighboring countries.

Powerful local business conglomerates have established dedicated front companies to facilitate this underground oil trafficking operation from Kurdistan's fields:

• In Erbil, Makal (affiliated with KAR Group) receives crude from Khurmala in Erbil operated by Forza, exporting it through Haji Omeran and Ibrahim Khalil border crossings.
• Pator smuggles oil from Erbil and Duhok into Iran through Sulaimani province via Bashmakh and Parwizkhan borders - For each tanker to pass into the PUK zone, a charge of $300-360 per tanker is applied.
• Unicode (tied to Lanaz Group) transports Duhok's crude to Iran and Turkey.
• Hydrocarbon Company (linked to Qaywan Group) trafficks fuel from Sulaimani and Koya into Iran.

Once in Iran, Kurdistan's oil is funneled to ports like Bandar Imam, Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, wherespecialized facilities prep the crude for global export.

While most goes to Iran, portions also reach Turkey, with a portion sent to the Tüpraş Batman refinery and the remainder to the Antakya and Mersin refineries.

Oil producers sell to these trafficking firms at cut-rate $28-$33 per barrel, which resell at $60 - a $25 discount to global prices, netting immense profits.

Specifically, DNO, Genel Energy, Taqa, and HKN sell oil at $31.50 per barrel in Duhok province, while Forza, Khurmala, Ain Zala, and Sufaya sell at $32 per barrel, and Sheikhan oil is sold at $28 per barrel.

These oil producers sell between 200,000 and 250,000 barrels daily to the four companies and domestic refineries, generating over $200 million monthly for producers like DNO, Genel, Taqa and HKN. But the real windfall is for the smuggling companies, raking in around $150 million each month.

Explainer: What is the Development Road project?

The Development Road project, with its grand vision, seeks to propel Iraq into a coveted position as a bustling transit hub, rivaling the likes of the illustrious Suez Canal and the proposed India-Middle East-Europe corridor. It envisions a network of high-speed trains, intertwined with local industry linkages, and supplemented by energy infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines.

The Kurdistan Region faces another major setback as the ambitious project, bypasses all major cities within the region. The exclusion of the Region in this project not only exacerbates its isolation, but also diminishes its significance, potentially relegating the KRG monopoly on the Turkish border to irrelevance.

The ramifications of this exclusion are profound. In fact, according to the new Iraq-Turkey security agreement, in addition to its potential, this project appears to also aim to further constrict and divide the Kurdish-populated areas in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey although if done right, it can also bring opportunities and economic development. However, as part of the project, Turkey has now conditioned the establishment of a security zone that essentially formalizes its control over some of the Kurdistan Region's most important territories. This development might lead to a direct connection between the said Turkish security zone and the Iraqi governmentcontrolled areas in Mosul, which has long been an objective of the 'Ovakoy' corridor in the Iraq-Syria-Turkey border triangle. This project also significantly undermines the economic potential of the Kurdistan Region, curtailing its ability to leverage its geographic proximity to Turkey. Moreover, it raises genuine concerns regarding the region's future role within the wider economic landscape of Iraq.

TURKEY

Political Dynamics

• On May 16, An Ankara court has sentenced former Democratic People’s Party (HDP) co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ to decades in prison in total in the Kobani Case, where 108 people are being tried for terror charges, including “disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state.” Ankara 22nd High Criminal Court sentenced Selahattin Demirtaş to 20 years in prison for aiding to disrupt the unity and integrity of the state, 4 years and 6 months for incitement to commit a crime, 2 years and 6 months for making propaganda for a terrorist organization, 1 year and 6 months for inciting people to disobey the law. Demirtaş was sentenced 42 years in prison in total with other sentences.

The trial, which has been ongoing for four years, involved charges against 108 members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), including former leaders and MPs, for crimes including "disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state" and "murdering 37 people," among other offenses. Those defendants were facing aggravated life sentences.

The politicians are accused of orchestrating the demonstrations in Turkey’s Kurdish-populated cities against ISIS’ attempts to invade Koban., a Kurdish town in Syria adjacent to the Kurdish border, upon orders from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Twenty-seven people were killed when the incidents turned violent. Some individuals lost their lives in conflicts with security forces, while others perished in clashes between HDP supporters and Islamist groups.The court acquitted 36 defendants including Selahattin Demirtaş on the grounds that it was not established that the defendants committed the crime of killing 6 people including Yasin B.rü and injuring others during the Kobani incidents in 2014.

The court sentenced Figen Yüksekdağ to 19 years for aiding the act of disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state, 4 years and 6 months for incitement to commit a crime, 2 years for violating the Law No. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations, 3 years for two separate charges of making propaganda for a terrorist organization, and 3 months for violating election bans. In total, Yüksekdağ was sentenced to 30 years and 3 months in prison. A U.S. Department of State spokesperson expressed concerns about the sentences to Rudaw on Monday and said the U.S. is supporting free speech and opposing “actions intended to encroach on the right of free speech.” In an interview after his conviction, Demirtas said the court verdict was made “years ago by the government” and that the court merely read the decision as a formality. Demirtaş notes that his ‘main goal’ is to achieve ‘a weaponless, non-violent solution’ for the Kurdish question in Turkey. However, he said that the Turkish state sees the Kurds’ work in ‘democratic politics’ as ‘more dangerous’ than them taking up arms

A 4-day protest ban was declared in Turkey's 12 provinces following the final hearing in the Koban. case of Kurdish politicians on May 16.

In Diyarbakır province, one of the strongholds of the Kurdish political movement, the governor’s office announced that demonstrations, open and closed meetings, and all kinds of protests are banned until May 20. The governor’s office referred to the Koban. case in the statement and stated that there were "terrorist organization sympathizers, marginal and radical groups who want to repeat the grave events that took place in the city before." The governor also announced that "persons and vehicles that are understood to have come to Diyarbakır to participate in these protests" were banned from entering the province. In similar statements, the governor’s offices of Mardin, Siirt, Dersim, Bing.l, Bitlis, Kars, Hakkari, İzmir, Muş, Adana, and Batman provinces announced a ban on all meetings and demonstrations for four days until May 20.Pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan said that they would assemble in Adana, Diyarbakır and Istanbul on May 18 with the slogan "Democracy for all, freedom for all."

Assessment: After years of politically motivated trials against 108 politicians from the pro-Kurdish .

The “Kobani Case” refers to an event where Kurdish politicians, alongside thousands of civilians, protested against ISIS in 2014 and called on the Turkish government to intervene and help civilians. Today’s ruling was based on decade-old speeches by the Kurdish politicians.

• Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered significant losses in local elections for the first time since 2002 on Sunday. Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), won 35 provincial municipalities to the AKP’s 24. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) won ten municipalities. Concurrently, the CHP won 14 cities in metropolitan elections, including Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana. The AKP won 12 cities, and the DEM Party secured victory in ten. Turkey’s Supreme Election Council announced 78.11 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in Sunday’s elections. Kurdish votes played a key role in the Istanbul mayoral election, as incumbent Akram Imamoglu defeated his AKP opponent by a margin of 51-39 percent. Granted, the co-chair of the DEM Party’s Istanbul branch Meral Bestas said Istanbul’s Kurds voted for Immaoglu to punish the AKP and that Istanbul’s mayor should not claim Kurdish votes as his own. The DEM Party won the majority of provincial and metropolitan elections in Turkey’s Kurdish region and scored big wins in Diyarbakir (Amed), Van, and Mardin. Millions of Kurds celebrated the DEM Party’s successes in the streets once the results were announced. Despite the DEM Party’s gains and the AKP’s losses, however, DEM Party officials accused the Turkish government of sending thousands of military personnel and police officers to vote in Kurdish areas amid irregular voting hours. DEM Party Co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları gave a victory speech to celebrate the party’s successes and, referring to the AKP, said, “The war alliance was defeated.” President Erdogan admitted his party’s defeat and failure to achieve “desired results” during a speech on March 31 but, as previously stated, also threatened new invasions of Iraq and Syria. On Tuesday, the electoral board in Van revoked the victory of the Kurdish candidate and granted the mayorship to the candidate of the ruling party, citing a verdict by the Ministry of Justice banning the winner from the DEM Party. Abdullah Zeydan, the Kurdish candidate, had been a political prisoner for seven years, but Turkey’s supreme court allowed his candidacy. DEM Party officials rejected the government’s action, describing it as a repetition of the trustee system, in which the government replaced dozens of elected Kurds with appointed trustees.

An analysis of Turkey’s critical local elections:

For the first time since its establishment in 2001, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its position as the party with the highest vote share to the main opposition. The polls marked a historic success for the Republican People’s Party (CHP), a left-leaning secular party, which emerged for the first time since 1977 as the leading party in an election. The main actor in this surprising dynamic was Turkey's runaway inflation, which hit almost 70% year-on-year in March. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's worst electoral defeat in nationwide municipal elections has changed Turkey's political landscape. However, the Opposition's victory came at an awkward time. Turkey's Western allies were looking to strengthen ties with the Turkish President.

Turkey's main opposition leftist-secular CHP (Republican People’s Party) gains in nationwide local elections are a significant reversal of the party's fortunes after Erdogan's resounding reelection in May 2023.

After the opposition's loss in the May elections, everybody thought the opposition was in a state of despair. But that doesn't seem to be the case, and it's a turning point for the Turkish political landscape.It's the first time since 1977 that CHP has managed to come out number one in the popular vote."

With much of the media under his control and the judiciary targeting dissent, critics claim Erdogan's grip on power is tightening. Addressing supporters on election night Ekrem Imamoglu, the re-elected CHP mayor for Istanbul who Erdogan personally tried to unseat, claimed his victory was a stand against the global threat of authoritarianism. "Today is a pivotal moment not only for Istanbul, but for democracy itself. As we celebrate our victory, we send a message that will reverberate worldwide,” Imamoglu told thousands of jubilant supporters."Democracy's decline is now ending," continued the mayor, "Istanbul stands as a beacon of hope, a testament to the resilience of democratic values in the face of growing authoritarianism."

There were no congratulations extended, even to Turkey's democracy, let alone to the opposition itself. one should note that This is a big contrast compared to the May elections because right after the May elections, the Western leaders, one after the other, extended their congratulations to Erdogan. So there is a recognition that Erdogan is here to stay, and they don't want to make him cross. And given that there is the Ukraine war on one side and the Gaza war on the other, they want a stable Turkey. Turkey's location, bordering the Middle East and Russia, makes Ankara a critical ally for Europe and the United States in international efforts to control migration and contain Russia. Ahead of the March polls, Erdogan had been engaged in rapprochement with his Western allies, with Washington even inviting the Turkish President for a summit in May. However, Erdogan could still pose a headache to his Western allies as he ramps up his nationalist rhetoric in the aftermath of his defeat.

It is the Economy determining the election results: Erdogan should fix the economy, which seems unlikely in the coming 1-2 years given the high inflation and widening gap between the rich and the poor in Turkey. Turkey's near 70% inflation and 50% interest rates were widely seen as key factors in AK Party's defeat. Through consecutive hikes from June 2023 to February 2024, the Central Bank raised the country’s benchmark interest rate from 8.5% to 50%. Borrowing and access to capital have become harder, and inflation began to bite; in particular, food prices skyrocketed, hitting a whooping 78%. But many analysts in Turkey say a new conflict could change the political rules of the game. The economy is a concern, but there is a war psyche, then he [Erdogan] might be propagating. Some Turkish analysts say the opposition victory will be viewed privately as inconvenient by some of Turkey's Western allies coming at a time of growing cooperation with Erdogan, with the fear now that Erdogan's resounding defeat could make the Turkish leader unpredictable at a critical time in both the Middle East and Russia's war with Ukraine.

Demise of Islamist Kurdish party

Meanwhile, the ultra-Islamist and pro-Kurdish party, the Free Cause Party (Huda Par), suffered a crushing defeat. The party, which was almost nonexistent in the political scene until last year's parliamentary election, also won four seats in the parliament, as it didn't need to pass the 7% election threshold after its inclusion to the AKP-led alliance. Inclusion of Huda Par in the AKP-led electoral alliance is widely believed to have been a ploy aimed at raising the profile of the Islamist party against the Dem Party, the largest political Kurdish movement in the country and the parliament’s third-biggest party.

However, that plan seems to have failed after Sunday's poll. Even in predominantly Kurdish Batman, one of the most conservative provinces of Turkey, the Dem Party’s feminist candidate, Gulistan Sonuk, won by sweeping more than 58% of the vote. Speaking of female candidates, another factor that made Sunday's elections historic was the success of female candidates. In addition to 11 female mayors at the provincial level, women won 64 district-level mayorships in the polls, Reuters reported this week.

The Kurdish question

Following Dem Party’s success in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority southeast and Erdogan’s post-election messages embracing democracy, the question at hand was whether Turkey would resort to heavy-handed tactics in the name of so-called security considerations to seize mayoral offices held by Dem Party members by appointing trustees close to the AKP.

What unfolded in the Kurdish-majority southeastern province of Van shows that there might be hope for Turkish democracy. As we reported earlier this week, local electoral authorities in the province initially annulled the landslide victory by the Dem Party’s candidate, Abdullah Zeydan, citing his former convictions of terror charges, sparking angry protests in the region. However, on Wednesday the country’s High Election Board (YSK) overturned the decision of its local branch and restored Zeydan as the mayor, as he had secured more than 55%, compared with the runner-up, AKP's Abdulahat Avras, who won 27.15%.

The protests turned into celebrations. However, according to Gursel, the backtracking may not necessarily signal a fresh approach by Erdogan and renewed commitment to democratic principles. The government would likely follow a “hybrid approach” when it comes to applying his authoritarian instincts.

Erdogan’s Approaching War against the PKK presence in northern Iraq:

Just after the election, Erdogan emphasized one more time that Turkey is determined to show that terrorism has no place in the future of Türkiye and the region," Erdogan said. "With the recent elections, this determination has been further strengthened." Meanwhile, as emphasized our Feb-March 2024 report, Erdogan has warned that his army is poised to launch a massive military offensive into Northern Iraq and Syria against the Kurdish group PKK, including affiliates that work with American forces in fighting the Islamic State.

A crackdown on the PKK, analysts say, will play well with conservative nationalist voters. Those voters were the ones with which the opposition scored its biggest successes in Central Turkey – a region known as Anatolia - for the first time in a generation. One should also note that, following the local elections, the parliamentary group of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) called for an investigation into alleged “irregularities,” which they claim prevented a “fair and democratic election” from taking place. Despite winning the majority of the Kurdish region, the DEM Party’s request for investigations came after several Kurdish cities experienced sudden changes in the closing of ballots. Additionally, the DEM Party accused the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of preventing fair and equal competition by mobilizing “all public institutions and resources” for its own benefit.

• On April 17, contrary to the expectations, the Ankara court did not issue its verdict on the critical Kobane trial, in which 108 Kurdish politicians being tried along with Selahattin Demirtas. The court announced that the verdict of Turkey’s high-profile Kobane trial will not take place on the 17 April. But that a ‘detainee examination’ would take place instead. Ankara 22nd High Criminal Court rejected the release request of 18 detainees, including former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş, in the Kobani case.
• On April 22, Turkish President Erdogan is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad , with one of the key agenda items being "natural gas and oil flow," according to his own statement. Several reports suggest that Erdogan not only seeks the resumption of oil exports from the KRG but also aims to secure Kurdistan's natural gas for export to Turkey as soon as possible, especially with apparent U.S. backing.

Analysis on Erdogan’s visit to Iraq

While Iraq has been preparing to resume oil exports from Kirkuk to Turkey, Erdogan likely prefers resuming exports through the KRG's pipeline, as Turkey has a 50-year contract with the KRG on favorable economic and security terms, with Turkish firms earning over $1 billion annually, in addition to other perks such as holding sway over the KRG's ties with the PKK.

However, Erdogan's interests extend beyond oil to the KRG's natural gas. This would reduce Turkey's dependence on Russian gas for energy consumption and position Turkey as a key gas hub for Europe, substantially increasing its geopolitical clout, in addition to further Turkish influence over the Kurdistan Region. Erdogan holds several powerful cards against Iraq to push for his demands, the most significant being water. Iraq desperately wants more water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which Turkey has gained substantial control over through the construction of several massive dams.

According to informed sources, the 50-year agreement signed by Nechirvan Barzani with Erdogan in 2014 reportedly includes the following terms:

- Turkish companies operating in the Kurdistan Region will be given priority in the KRG oil sector.

- For the next 50 years, Turkey will receive $1 per barrel of oil sold.

- The KRG's oil revenue will be deposited and exchanged at Turkey's Halk Bank.

- The KRG oil pipeline will be guarded by Turkey, with fees paid from the KRG's oil revenue.

- The KRG will lease seven large oil reservoirs at Turkey's Ceyhan Port, with rent paid from its oil revenue.

- The agreement sets the framework for the KRG's relations with the Syrian Kurdish SDF and the PKK.

- Critics claim the agreement's political dimension is to maintain the KDP's power and continue its leaders' rule in the Kurdistan Region with Ankara's support.

- Unofficial reports suggest the Erdogan family is the primary beneficiary of this agreement's proceeds from the Turkish side.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-awaited visit to Iraq occulted during the ongoing Israeli attack to Gaza. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani stated that it is the time for the two countries to resolve the issues instead of postponing, which increased expectations from the visit.

Despite the fact that these two countries share a long land border, it was the first visit after 13 years. To what extent the visit meets expectations is difficult to answer. However, it can be said that there are no jaw-dropping results in the short term.

Joint combat with against PKK is uncertain

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Iraq in August 2023 which was interpreted as a preparatory initiative for Erdogan’s visit. Erdogan’s one-day visit to Baghdad and Erbil with a large delegation resulted in 26 agreements and memorandums of understanding in different areas.

Turkey's traditional stances in Iraq are security, economy, protection of Turkmens and preservation of territorial integrity in Iraq. However, some acute priorities that cross these stances have been a Catch-22 situation for the two neighbors for years. The first priority for Ankara, which carries out military operations within the scope of the doctrine of "destroying terrorism at its source", is to defeat the PKK. Turkey prepares for a comprehensive military operation against the PKK within the borders of Iraq.

Following Erdogan's statement in the first week of March, “We will have solved the problems regarding our Iraqi border this summer,” Fidan met with his Iraqi counterpart in Baghdad with his accompanying delegation. In the meeting, it was declared, the decision taken by the Iraqi National Security Council which considered the PKK a “banned” organization and it was considered as a victory for Ankara. In Baghdad, Erdogan said the two leaders discussed steps the two countries could take against the PKK. Even though Erdogan appreciated the step that Iraq took to designate PKK as a banned organization, he made it clear that Turkey expects Iraq to recognize the PKK as a “terrorist organization”.

Ankara, which thinks that Baghdad has long considered the PKK as an issue between the Kurds and Turkey and referred the problem to Erbil, argues that the federal government should now take more initiatives on the issue. Furthermore, Turkey expects that action should be taken regarding PUK's relations with the PKK, especially in Sulaymaniyah. However, the lack of concrete results on the joint combat with the PKK in the meeting means that Ankara will continue attacks due to the organization's activities in the Kurdistan Region, also in Kirkuk and Sinjar. Despite Iraqi officials’ warnings of violations of sovereignty and the damage to relations between the two capitals, Ankara seems likely to continue its fight against terrorism. Thus, relations on this issue are likely to remain tense.

Critical turning point in the Development Road

In addition to the fight against terrorism, Turkey's critical priorities in Iraq is to strengthen and protect economic relations. Ankara tries to separate the trade volume exceeding 20 billion dollars from problematic agendas with Baghdad. One of the prominent agendas of Erdogan's visit was the Development Road Project. The project, which includes railway and road lines starting from the Great Faw Port in Basra, passing through Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad and Mosul and extending to the Turkish border, is envisaged to provide access to Mersin Port from the Turkish border and reach Europe via Istanbul by road. Iraq and Turkey aim to shorten the travel time between Asia and Europe and become transit centers through the project.

Turkish and Iraqi authorities have been working closely on the project for a while. Since that period, there has been intense contact traffic between Ankara and Baghdad regarding the project at all bureaucratic and political levels. In fact, a “mechanism similar to the Council of Ministers” will be established between the parties regarding the project. As a matter of fact, during Erdogan's visit to a preliminary agreement between Turkey, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to cooperate on the project was signed. This agreement is probably one of the most concrete outcomes of the visit. However, there is no concrete projection yet regarding the security risks, proper financing, Iran’s opposition to the Development Road project and the exclusion of the Erbil administration and the timetable of the project. Particularly, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) concerns about the project that will enter Turkey from Ovak.y need to be eliminated. Because the KRI is worried that an alternative border gate to Fishkhabur may turn into a trump card over time.

Resumption of oil flow remains unresolved

Turkey pursues to strengthen relations with Baghdad and Erbil regarding energy, especially gas. Reopening oil pipelines, which have been closed for more than a year, was one of the agenda items of Erdogan's visit. Oil poured from the KRI was marketed freely via Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, according to a deal between Ankara and Erbil in 2014. Iraq sued Turkey at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in arbitration following the start of autonomous Kurdish exports. Baghdad said that by permitting oil exports from the KRI without its consent, Turkey had violated a 1973 pipeline deal. In March 2023, the International Chamber of Commerce issued its verdict requiring Turkey to reimburse Baghdad for enabling oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey without the consent of the Iraqi federal government, amounting to around 1.47 billion USD.

Ankara has been announcing for a long time that it is ready to reopen the oil pipeline. Erbil also states that it is ready on this issue, but it is no secret that Baghdad puts forward excuses with regards to this matter. Particularly considering that Baghdad recently has been systematically pressuring the Erbil administration, it can be assumed that the ball is in the federal government's court that wants the contracts of oil companies working with KRI to be transferred to Baghdad. The ICC’s ruling was a process of Baghdad taking revenge on Ankara and Erbil, but in this process, the focus has turned into the issue between Erbil and Baghdad. Despite expectations during Erdogan's visit, there has been no progress in resumption of oil exports. Turkey’s precondition is claimed to restart the flow of oil if Iraq was to withdraw a second lawsuit. The latter ICC case relates to KRG oil exports from 2018 until April 2023. Failure to resolve the issue seems likely to fuel distrust in Ankara-Baghdad relations and increase Erbil's economic bottleneck.

No immediate solution for water sharing

During a press conference Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia' al-Sudani said that a 10-year agreement on management of water resources that ensures Iraq will get its fair share was agreed upon with the Turkish side. However, the water issue could almost be described as a gangrene between the two capitals. Considering the water issue as an area of cooperation that serves common interests, Turkey claims that Iraq is not sufficiently careful about its water use. In response to this claim, Baghdad accuses Ankara of adopting an unfair approach to water flows via its dam construction policy. Erdogan in 2019 appointed former minister of forestry and water affairs Veysel Eroglu as a special envoy to Iraq to resolve this problem. Eroglu has worked on an action plan on water management with a designated team and carried out joint studies. However, it is difficult to say that concrete progress has been made for the time being. The new agreement on management of water resources may seem promising, but judging by past experiences, the water issue may continue to remain one of the unresolved areas between the parties.

With Ankara's appointment of Fidan as Foreign Minister last June, relations with Iraq gained a strong momentum, particularly with the contacts established with pro-Iran actors. However, the high expectation from Erdogan’s visit seems to fall short. The fact that the visit came after a long time shows that relations with Baghdad and Erbil are significant to Turkey. Political stabilization in Baghdad and balanced relations with Erbil seem to remain indispensable for Ankara for a long time.

• On May 3, For the first time since the local elections, leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) met with the Turkish opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Ankara. The Dem Party’s delegation included co-chairs Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan, along with vice co-chair .zlem Gündüz. Both parties stated that the meeting aimed to discuss the election outcomes and the current political landscape in Turkey and the broader region. CHP leader .zgür .zel expressed gratitude to the HDP, stating, “We had the opportunity to exchange ideas and evaluate the local election results and their implications for the upcoming general election and the challenges facing democracy in Turkey.”

SYRIA

Political Dynamics

• On April 7, in an interview, the SDF commander Mazlum Kobane emphasized important points.

Kobane said that the war in Gaza and the broadening regional conflict between Israel, Iran and its proxies have provided an opening for the Islamic State to increase its attacks against his forces. He warns that while the world is distracted, ISIS continues to make gains that could see it return to its former strength and status.

Amid mounting conjecture that the United States is looking to withdraw its 900 troops from northeast Syria, earlier this year that the Biden administration is probing possible cooperation between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the rival Syrian Arab Army, but Kobane says Washington has conveyed it intends to stick around. As Kobane emphasized that the conditions are ripe for an ISIS resurgence, he told in interview that Russian commanders had reached out for information after the recent deadly attack in Moscow by the Islamic State’s Khorasan arm.

Conflict Dynamics

• On April 16, according to a report by Syrian Kurdish media, Iranian-backed militias are recruiting fighters in Homs and Hama and preparing them to fight the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir Ez Zor, similar to last year’s support for tribes fighting the SDF. The region remains unstable due to increasing attacks by ISIS (Da’esh) and the presence of Iranian-backed militias. The Public Security Service (Asayesh)announced the arrest of a terrorist in charge of a “guest house” in al-Shaddadi. Da’esh terrorists and Iranian-backed militias attacked the SDF in several areas in the past week.

IRAN

Political Dynamics

• On May 19, Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi died in a fiery helicopter crash this weekend. Raisi was a close supporter of Iran’s Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with a long history opposing the rights of women and ethnic minorities in Iran. Raisi has earned a special space in Hell for his bigotry towards women and hatred of Kurds.

Raisi’s sordid biography includes his leading role cracking down against the nationwide protest movement that followed the murder of 22-year old Zhina Amini, the young Kurdish woman who was beaten to death by the Morality Police for refusing to properly wear her hijab. Reports of police brutality causing a cerebral hemorrhage sparked nationwide protests by women demanding an end to autocratic clerical rule. Her death led to the global” Woman, Life, and Freedom Movement” that mobilized women across the country. Up to 500 were killed by security forces who beat women and dragged them through the streets by their hear. Environmental and economic concerns exacerbated social tensions, leading to protests in ethnic areas such as Iranian Kurdistan and other territories such as Iranian Azerbaijan where minorities reside. Ongoing problems in Iran’s remote restive regions are endemic, Iran’s problems resulted from mismanagement, incompetence and ineffective leadership, worsened by Raisi’s hubris.

Crowds at Raisi’s funeral suggest he was a beloved leader respected by his many followers. Nothing could be further from the truth. Sayyids, clerics and religious followers made up most of the crowd. Others were sent by bus to augment the appearance of an adoring crowd. The regime sponsored thier accommodation. The funeral was led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hamas’ Ismael Haniya, recently indicted by the ICC, also attended.

Expect low voter turnout when Iranians soon go to the polls. The Guardian Council will disqualify candidates who represent genuine reform or opposition to the Supreme Leader. Ibrahim Raisi was a placeholder. He will be quickly replaced by another mullah representing the Shiite establishment.

• The Iranian regime launched a new crackdown on women and redoubled its efforts to enforce the nation’s strict hijab laws. The regime’s most recent crackdown began when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) formed a new security unit tasked with assaulting and detaining women, including teenagers, who violate hijab laws. Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights spokesperson Jeremy Laurence claimed Iranian authorities have shut down hundreds of businesses for failing to enforce hijab laws. Concurrently, over 160 Iranian lawmakers expressed support for a new “mandatory hijab law.” Meanwhile, the regime arrested more Kurds last week, including a member of the teachers’ union in Senna named Khaled Ahmadi, an activist named Matin Hassani in Bokan, an athlete in Urmia namedAfshin Nejadaziz, and two religious activists in Saqqez. Moreover, the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights reported the regime sentenced two Kurdish protesters in Bokan to 15 months and 11 days in prison. Simultaneously, Iranian border guards wounded two Kurdish border porters (kolbar) near Nowsud. Lastly, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on more than a dozen “entities, individuals, and vessels” facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones.
• Iranian ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh told an Iranian outlet that the three elements of Iran’s 2023 security agreement with Iraq are “border control by Iraq’s central government, disarmament of opposition groups and exchanges of criminals, and the transfer of opposition groups away from Iraq’s border with Iran.” Al Sadegh also said previous security agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did not solve the issue of Iranian opposition groups operating on Iraqi soil. The Iranian regime has targeted Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan on multiple occasions. Separately, al Sadegh called the anti- U.S. Iraqi “resistance” independent but said, “We (Iran) have helped the resistance at times, and we have officially announced it, and we do not hesitate to express it.”

Conflict Dynamics

• On April 4, according to Iraq media, Iraqi and Turkish officials revealed a planned Turkish military operation targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Per the report, Iran has approved the operation, as Iranian-backed militias are becoming a “crucial partner” in Turkey’s war on the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a phone conversation with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on March 31 and has threatened to launch additional incursions into Iraq and Syria on multiple occasions, most recently during a speech on Sunday. The semi-official Iranian outlet Mehr News claimed Raisi hoped that “the cooperation between Tehran and Ankara would lead to securing the interests of the two nations and increasing unity among the Islamic ummah.”

Key issues Worth Monitoring in Coming Two Months

- Whether or not the conflict dynamic between the Turkish state and the PKK in northern Iraq, northern Syria and in Turkey’s soil will increase after the 31 March local elections and Kobane trials,

- Whether or not the Turkish state will appoint state trustees after toppling the elected DEM Party mayors in the Kurdish majority cities in Turkey’s southeast

- How the death of Iran’s president Raisi will affect the power relations in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq among the high profiles of the Barzani-led KDP and the PUK.

- The evolution of power relations between Baghdad and Erbil after the Iraqi supreme court rulings comprehensively restricting the political and economic autonomy of the Kurdish region.

- If not postponed, the handling and the results of the local parliamentary election in the KRG region