Key Takeaways for the Period of June-July 2024

• On July 5, Barzani visited Baghdad, marking first in six years. This visit comes as the Kurdistan Region prepares for parliamentary elections on October 20 and amid increased Turkish military activity within the region and disputes over power sharing between Baghdad and Erbil in political and economic issues. Key topics include; Salaries of Kurdistan Regional Government employees, the pending oil and gas law, upcoming Kurdistan elections, the appointment of a new governor for Kirkuk, implementation of the Sinjar agreement. Additionally, Barzani addressed two pressing security concerns with the Iraqi Prime Minister and other officials; recent Turkish military operations in the Kurdistan Region and attacks on Erbil by pro-Iran Iraqi armed groups. During his visit to Baghdad, Barzani met with Shia leader Nouri al-Maliki five times within the span of two days. Some reports suggest the two are quietly working on building an alliance, as each aims to maintain dominance within their respective Kurdish and Shia regions. This potential alliance marks a significant shift in their relationship, given their tumultuous history.

• There has been sharp increase about the number of reportings&news about Turkey’s military presence in the KDP-controlled areas in northern Iraq, and intensifying Turkish air strikes and military activities on the ground. Erdogan said in late July at the military academy graduation ceremony that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) had been "completely trapped" in both Iraq and Syria, that Turkish forces were "all over them". He further said "We will complete the missing points of the security corridor along our southern border with Syria." These remarks show that Turkey will highly likely to continue to intensify its military build-up in the region so as to cut the PKK’s logistic routes between Iraq and Syria via Sinjar region and not let the PKK militants to infiltrate into Turkey easily. The KDP leaders seem to fully support Turkey’s military efforts in the region, in contrast, the PUK leaders seem to have more critical stance on this.

• In the months of June-July, As Erbil's water crisis has severely intensified. There is a stark contrast emerges between the city's struggling neighborhoods and opulent developments. While ordinary residents increasingly rely on water tankers, the luxurious Erbil Hills project (pictured), owned by Barzani family members, boasts artificial lakes and golf courses fed by over 100 newly drilled wells per an ex-MP, significantly exacerbating the water shortage. This water crisis exemplifies a broader pattern of mismanagement and disregard for local residents as well as a systemic issue of resource allocation and governance.

• On June 3, Turkish government assigns first trustee (state-affiliated administrator) to the Kurdish- majority city of Hakkari in southeast if Turkey after arresting and removing the elected mayor Mehmet Siddik Akis (from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party) for PKK-linked charges. The appointment of a trustee to Hakkari Municipality and the detention of the elected mayor have significant implications for democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey. This move could further erode trust in the government and lead to increased tensions between the state and pro-Kurdish political representatives. This move is a clear indication that nobody should hope for a detente (or normalization) in Turkey when it comes to the Kurdish question in Turkey. It is likely that President Erdogan is trying to gain time and gloss over the atmosphere created by the 31 March local election defeat by creating the atmosphere that he is trying to get rid of his ultra-nationalist ally the MHP party. Erdogan’s remarks after the arrest accusing that DEM part-led Kurdish politics in Turkey under full control of the PKK prove this assumption. So, in coming months, one should note that Erdogan will neither likely burn bridges with MHP nor change his attitude towards the Kurdish political movement.

• The local election in the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF-controlled northeast Syria scheduled for the second week of June was postponed due to Ankara’s fierce opposition and Washington DC’s attempts of not provoking Turkey.

• • On July 12, Turkish president Erdogan announced that he has instructed Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to meet Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to start to restore relations& start normalization process with Syria. Despite Esad regime’s incessant call for withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria as a condition to re- start engagement, Turkey seems to seek for finding a way to start negotiations with Esad regime by keeping Turkish soldiers inside Syria.

IRAQ &The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG)

Political Dynamics

• • • On June 2, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil called for an immediate meeting with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Natural Resources and the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) to discuss Iraqi Kurdistan’s stalled oil exports. The Ministry of Oil released a statement claiming the purpose of the meeting is “reaching an agreement to accelerate the restart of production to resume oil exports.” The KRG and the APIKUR have repeatedly called for the Iraqi government to end the freeze on Iraqi Kurdistan’s exports, which has cost Iraq billions of dollars since it was implemented in March 2023. It remains unclear when the exports will resume, but the APIKUR said its member companies are “prepared to resume exports, contingent upon reaching agreements that provide for payment surety for past and future exports, direct payment and preservation of commercial terms.
    • On June 2, Prime Minister of Kurdistan Region Masrour Barzani met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani in Baghdad to discuss Iraqi Kurdistan’s budget, most notably public employee salaries. “A permanent resolution to payment disputes would allow us to prioritize cooperation in the oil and gas, banking, digital, and agriculture sectors,” said Barzani. Iraqi Kurdistan’s estimated share of the Iraqi budget is nearly 22 trillion dinars, but Baghdad must agree to release the funds.
    • On June 6, Iraq’s electoral commission announced that political parties could now self-register for the upcoming KRG legislative elections. The registration window opened on June 8 and ended five days later. Jumana al-Ghalai, spokesperson of Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), told the media that the decision allows parties, coalitions, and independent and minority candidates to self-register. This process means that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) can now register, after it had been boycotting the process due to concerns about the election mechanism. The KDP and several minority parties had refused to join the process until certain changes were implemented. For instance, Baghdad will now allocate five seats for minorities in the KRG’s three provinces. This change responds to an Iraqi court decision that had stripped these minorities of their allotted seats in the legislature. As of now, elections are set to happen on September 5.
    • On June 23, On Monday, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) stated it would be hard to hold the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) parliamentary elections on September 5. An IHEC spoke person said, “It is difficult to hold elections on September 5 and we cannot hold the elections on that date. That date was set a month ago and the commission determines its work on the basis of the official date of the elections.” President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani has yet to set an official date for the elections. The IHEC postponed the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 10 in May, which led to talks of holding elections on September 5. That said, the IHEC vowed to hold the elections before its mandate expires in January 2025.
    • On June 8, Turkey extended its flight ban on Sulaimani International Airport for an additional six months, the director of the airport. "Turkey extended its flight ban on Sulaimani airport until December 7, 2024,” Handren Mufti, the director of Sulaimani International Airport, told local media.

Assessment: This is the third extension of Turkey’s decision to bar flights in and out of Sulaimani from its airspace since an initial three-month ban was imposed on April 3 of last year. The latest extension was in December and the ban was set to expire on June 22. When first imposing the ban last year, Turkish foreign ministry spokesperson Tanju Bilgic said it was in response to an alleged “intensification” of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activity in Sulaimani province, referring to the crash of two helicopters carrying Syrian Kurdish fighters a month earlier. Nine members of the anti-terrorism forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were killed in the crash, including their commander, according to the SDF. The helicopters were bound for Sulaimani. Ankara alleges the Syria forces are affiliated with the PKK. Turkish officials have repeatedly accused Sulaimani authorities of supporting the PKK and the flight ban is not the first time Ankara has taken punitive measures against the province. Following Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum in 2017, international airspace to Erbil and Sulaimani airports was ordered closed by the Iraqi federal government. Turkey and most other countries re-opened their airspace to planes bound for Erbil in March 2018. However, Ankara refused to allow flights bound for Sulaimani, citing alleged support for the PKK by the province’s ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In 2017, Ankara expelled the PUK’s representative to Turkey after the PKK captured two Turkish intelligence agents in Sulaimani province. Turkey also frequently carries out air and drone strikes on PKK targets in the province. Speaking at a regional forum in Erbil in October, PUK leader Bafel Talabani said that his party’s problems with Turkey are “hard to resolve.”

• • On 13 June, Iran’s Acting Foreign Minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, visited Iraq and met with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. The officials discussed bilateral relations and ways to enhance them. Later, Bagheri visited the Kurdistan Region and met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials, including former President Masoud Barzani, President Nechirvan Barzani, and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani.

Assessment: These meetings took place against a tense backdrop; Iran has supported radical militants attacking Kurdistan. However, Nechirvan Barzani’s recent visit has temporarily eased tensions between Tehran and Erbil.

• • On June 13, The U.S. Ambassador Tracey Jacobson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She has been nominated to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. During her hearing, Ambassador Jacobson stated that Iran-friendly militias pose the biggest threat to Iraq’s stability and sovereignty. She pledged that, if confirmed, she would use the U.S. ‘s policy tools to counter these militias and reduce Iran’s influence in the region. She also committed to preventing ISIS’s resurgence. Ambassador Jacobson emphasized the importance of the KRG and pledged to strengthen relations between Erbil and Washington, as well as between Erbil and Baghdad. Iraq’s government criticized Ambassador Jacobson’s comments, arguing that they reflect a lack of understanding of a “new Iraq” and amount to interference in Iraqi internal affairs. Nevertheless, a government spokesperson acknowledged that Ambassador Jacobson’s appointment could strengthen relations between the U.S. and Iraq. Ambassador Jacobson brings over 30 years of experience to the post, having served in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kosovo.
  • On July 5, Barzani visited Baghdad, marking first in six years. Ahead of Barzani's visit, Bafel Talabani of the PUK arrived in Baghdad. Masoud Barzani refused to allow PUK's Bafel Talabani to attend July 5 Baghdad meeting with State Administration Coalition leaders, despite mediation attempts by Nouri al-Maliki. Barzani met other coalition members, including pro-Iran Shia leaders, but deliberately excluded Talabani. The PUK, part of the coalition that formed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's cabinet, was notably absent. Although Talabani was in Baghdad, he did not participate in the meeting. Many other leaders attended, including top pro-IRGC figures such as AbuFadak from Kataib Hezbollah and Qais al-Khazali from Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Turkmen Front leader Hasan Turan and most Shiite and Sunni leaders were also present. According to investigations by Draw Media, Nouri al-Maliki attempted to facilitate Talabani's participation to normalize relations between Barzani and Talabani, but Barzani rejected this proposal. The meeting, which included discussions between KDP leader  Masoud Barzani and Shiite Coordination Framework leaders, took place throughout the day and into the evening. On July 5-6, Talabani met with Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Fayaq Zaidan (head of Iraqi judiciary), and the head of coalition forces in Iraq and Syria.

Assessment: This visit comes as the Kurdistan Region prepares for parliamentary elections on October 20 and amid increased Turkish military activity within the region. Prior to Barzani's Baghdad visit, Faleh Fayyaz, head of Hashd al-Shaabi, met Barzani in Erbil after visiting the Nineveh Plain. Discussions about implementing the Sinjar agreement between Erbil and Baghdad are ongoing. Barzani’s visit comes after his party had recently normalized relations with Tehran. The Iraqi Federal Court has postponed KRG parliamentary elections following a complaint by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. Today, it also issued a ruling endorsing Barzani's MyAccount project to domicile KRG civil servants' salaries. In his historic visit to Baghdad, Barzani met with top Iraqi officials to tackle a range of issues, from financial matters and oil legislation to regional elections and security concerns. Key topics include:

1. Salaries of Kurdistan Regional Government employees
2. The pending oil and gas law
3. Upcoming Kurdistan elections
4. The appointment of a new governor for Kirkuk
5. Implementation of the Sinjar agreement

Additionally, Barzani addressed two pressing security concerns with the Iraqi Prime Minister and other officials: Recent Turkish military operations in the Kurdistan Region&attacks on Erbil by pro-Iran Iraqi armed groups. During his visit to Baghdad, Barzani met with Shia leader Nouri al-Maliki five times within the span of two days. Some reports suggest the two are quietly working on building an alliance, as each aims to maintain dominance within their respective Kurdish and Shia regions. This potential alliance marks a significant shift in their relationship, given their tumultuous history. In 2014, Barzani was one of the leading figures opposing Nouri al-Maliki, accusing him of authoritarianism.

Conflict Dynamics

Please see below map for the zones of control, as well as the PKK's areas of activity in the Kurdistan Region:

See below Map of territorial control in the northern Kurdistan Region, according to Turkish sources.

It's important to note that the Iraqi Police in these areas are composed of KDP-affiliated Kurds but employed as border police brigades under the control of the Iraqi Interior Ministry.

As seen above map, Turkish military bases and outposts in the Kurdistan Region, along with areas targeted by airstrikes up to the end of 2023 which provides some context to understand the current Turkish military operations in Amedi.

Note that 100% of the Turkish military presence is within KDP-controlled areas, including the cities of Erbil and Duhok. While airstrikes have intensified in PUK-controlled areas, it can be argued that the region has effectively split into two zones: one with a Turkish military presence (KDP zone) and another that has become a de facto political and military sanctuary for the PKK (PUK zone). In the latter, the PKK has had the opportunity to establish some of its military infrastructure in areas hundreds of kilometers from the Turkish border.

Assessment:

Turkey is extensively deploying helicopters for both attack missions and airborne insertions of Commando forces in its current military operations against the PKK. These operations are primarily concentrated in the Matin Mountains within the Amedi district.

Turkey's current military operation in the Matin mountains is a prelude to a larger offensive in the Gara mountains in the near future as Turkey is amassing troops near Gara, per Sharq al-Awsat newspaper. A Turkish Defense Ministry official has stated: "Technical work on establishing a joint operations center with the Iraqi government and the KRG to combat the PKK is progressing smoothly." The ongoing attacks on key strategic hilltops in Matin aim to encircle the mountain range and isolate it from the Gara mountains, laying the groundwork for troop deployment at the northern approaches to Gara. According to the Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Turkish forces are amassing between the Matin and Gara mountains in preparation for a major operation in Gara. This area is considered one of the PKK's crucial strongholds, linking Qandil, Turkey, Sinjar, and Syria, and is among the most heavily fortified PKK territories. The Turkish Defense Minister recently announced their intention to secure control of Gara by October of 2024, before the onset of the snowy winter season.

• On July 10, Turkish Defense Minister has said that they have a timeline to occupy the Gara mountains (the PKK’s most important region in the Kurdistan Region) before November this year.

"We have now entered PKK territory that we haven’t been able to reach for the past 30 years," he claimed.

Assessment: Turkish operations in Kurdistan are indeed strange. If Iraqi and Kurdish officials gave the go- ahead, they will face major trouble, both domestically with their constituencies and politically with Ankara afterward.

It will be extremely difficult to get Turkish troops out of the territory they occupy. That would mean going to war with a NATO member and a powerful army (US & EU would always turn a blind eye to Turkish shenanigans, especially as they struggle to maintain geopolitical gains amid growing global competitions and the birth of bi/multipolarity).

If the Turks manage to establish firm territorial control over Iraqi territories, even post-Erdogan, non-AKP administrations very likely would not let go of it due to its significance for their perception of Turkish national security, domestic backlash and fear of appearing weak and not sufficiently nationalist, and historical imperial fantasies, including Ottoman rule and the National Pact-related ambitions about N. Iraq [and N. Syria too]).

Analysis - PKK in Kurdistan Region: Unwelcome Guest or Last Bastion of Pan-Kurdish Resistance?

1. The PKK's presence in the Kurdistan Region dates back to the 1980s, well before the region was actually established. The KDP's argument that the PKK has planted itself to somehow lure Turkey to invade the Kurdistan Region is weak, as the PKK's presence in the region is not new and predates the establishment of the Kurdistan Region itself.
2. The KDP's alliance with Turkey is primarily tactical but also one of the oldest, as the KDP has been cooperating with Turkey against the PKK since the 1990s. In fact, KDP Peshmerga actively fought alongside Turkish troops against the PKK in 1997 well before Erdogan came to power. As many as 5,000 KDP Peshmerga were killed in clashes with the PKK, and the Turkish troops largely withdrew following one of their biggest defeats at the hands of the PKK at the time. Notably, Turkish troops were stationed at Bamarni airbase at the invitation of Masoud Barzani, with the green light from the US in 1997.
3. While there might be some truth to the claim that the PKK's presence has given Turkey justification to further entrench itself in the Kurdistan Region, it's important to note that the Turkish permanent presence in the region was actually at the invitation of Masoud Barzani in 1997 at the height of the Kurdish civil war between KDP- PUK-PKK - a well-established fact. In fact one of the primary reasons for the 1997 Turkish operations in the region, for many analysts, was to "strengthen Barzani's KDP".
4. For the PKK, remaining in the mountains of the Kurdistan Region is a matter of survival. Indeed, one of the key reasons for their persistence and success has been their ability to entrench themselves in the extreme terrain of the Kurdistan Region. They use this area as a launching stage for attacks inside Turkey, in addition to employing ruthless, often controversial tactics against rival Kurdish groups in Turkey. These actions have aimed to eliminate potential Kurdish opposition that might be used against them. Whether the reasons that led to the emergence of the PKK following the 1980 coup still exist, or whether the PKK should now lay down arms, is a separate debate beyond the scope of this analysis.
5. The fundamental problem lies in the geographical division of the Kurdish population and the fact that they are sandwiched between two regional powerhouses: Turkey and Iran. This situation forces every Kurdish armed group to somehow ally with one of these two powers for their survival, often at the expense of other Kurdish groups in the home country of their ally. Consequently, forming alliances with powerful regional countries isn't unique to the KDP but a common strategy among Kurdish factions.
6. Some nationalist circles and KDP supporters argue that while the PKK has existed in the region since the 1980s, now that Kurdistan is an established entity, the PKK's presence poses a danger and they should leave. However, this argument is weak because we have evidence of what happens to groups that fail to balance their interests between their own Kurdish region and the sensitivities of the Kurdistan Region. For example, Iranian Kurdish groups have essentially disappeared due to getting too close to the KDP or PUK, becoming corrupt, and claiming to be considerate of the Kurdistan Region's realities.

1. The PKK, which has taken a different approach, is indeed the only other entity outside the KDP and PUK in the wider Middle East that has survived. This survival can be attributed to the PKK being shrewd, creative, and often ruthless in its tactics and strategies.

1. • On July 12, at the NATO meeting, Turkish president Erdogan says “The cooperation between Turkish security forces and the Erbil authorities [KDP] is commendable”.

He further said on the PUK ties with the PKK: "Until the Sulaimani authorities distance themselves from the PKK, our stance towards Sulaimani will remain unchanged. Our blockades will continue… We have informed [Barzanis] that Sulaimani needs to take certain steps, after which we will reassess our position. The ball is in their court." Turkish Airlines has suspended flights from Sulaimani Airport since April 3. Additionally, Turkey has imposed restrictions on its airspace, prohibiting flights to and from Sulaimani airport from passing through. Turkey claims that the PKK has a significant presence in Sulaimani and has "infiltrated the airport, posing a security threat to their flights." Senior PUK officials, including Deputy KRG PM Qubad Talabani, have held several meetings with Turkish officials to negotiate the reopening of Turkish airspace for flights to Sulaimani airport, but have not yet reached an agreement.

Analysis: Despite extensive reports about the increasing role of drones and their wider deployment, airstrikes conducted by manned aircraft remain by far the primary source of air support for the Turkish military in its operations against the PKK in the Kurdistan Region.

Turkish forces carried out 1,548 attacks and bombings against the PKK in the Kurdistan Region and Nineveh province in 2023.

The breakdown includes: 1,159 airstrikes, 228 drone attacks, 114 artillery attacks, 3 shooting attacks, 2 landmine attacks.

1. • • On July 14.Turkey will end its "Claw-Lock" cross-border operation in northern Iraq soon, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said "We will close the lock very soon in the Claw Operation Zone in northern Iraq," Erdoğan said at the National Defense University's graduation ceremony. Turkish forces have carried out cross-border operations against outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants in northern Iraq since 2019. Operation Claw-Lock, initiated by Turkey on April 18, 2022, aimed to target PKK positions within northern Duhok province along the Turkish border. Recently, Erdoğan has been stating that Ankara is nearing completion of a zone intended to "permanently resolve" security concerns.

Erdogan said that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) had been "completely trapped" in both Iraq and Syria, telling young military academy graduates that Turkish forces were "all over them". "We will complete the missing points of the security corridor along our southern border with Syria."

Assessment: Erdogan's comments tally with those made earlier this week by Turkey's Defence Minister Yasar Guler, who said his country was "determined" to clear the border area with Iraq and neighbouring Syria of "terrorists".

1. • • On June 30, In a joint press conference, spokespersons for the Iraqi and KRG interior ministries announced the arrest of a 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐞-𝐦𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐏𝐊𝐊 𝐜𝐞𝐥𝐥 responsible for recent 𝐦𝐚𝐣𝐨𝐫 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭𝐬 𝐚𝐜𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐬 𝐄𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐥, 𝐊𝐢𝐫𝐤𝐮𝐤, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐃𝐮𝐡𝐨𝐤. The incidents include fires at the Qaysari markets in Erbil and Kirkuk, the Langa Bazaar in Erbil, and the Chali market in Duhok.

The Iraqi interior ministry spokesperson revealed that the cell had additional plans to further destabilize these cities but was apprehended through a joint KRG and Iraqi operation. The spokesperson also stated that the cell members had received training from the PKK in the Qandil mountains and the nearby Sangasar area, and emphasized that they have conclusive evidence confirming the PKK is behind the fire incidents. Additionally, the KRG interior ministry spokesperson disclosed that one of the three arrested individuals works with the PUK anti-terror force but was allegedly directed by the PKK.

Assessment: Interestingly, this development coincides with major Turkish military deployments into the Kurdistan Region. Turkey is preparing for unprecedented military operations across areas where the PKK is suspected to have a presence. Notably, neither the Iraqi government nor the KRG has commented on these Turkish military activities, which may indicate their tacit approval of the operations. This silence could be linked to the Iraqi government's push for the Development Road project, which aims to connect the Gulf with Europe via Iraq and Turkey.

1. • • • In the period of June-July, environmental damage in the Amedi district continues to escalate due to the ongoing conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK, as well as intense Turkish airstrikes conducted as part of their operations against the PKK. According to local villagers, at least 10,000 trees have been destroyed, along with vast areas of vegetation, as a result of recent clashes.

The Turkish military has recently intensified its operations against the PKK in the region, deploying hundreds of armored vehicles and weapons. Additionally, they are establishing new military roadblocks and outposts throughout the area. Amedi is renowned as the Kurdistan Region's most verdant district, with 60% of its area covered in greenery, according to data from 2018.

• Germany’s Consulate General in Erbil on July 4 announced that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA) and the German Army had launched a joint project worth €3.2 million in Erbil.

• On July 15, The Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC) has blamed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for an attack on a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official in Sulaimani province. The PKK targeted a senior party official in Kalar city on Monday by attaching explosives to his car, the KRSC said in a statement Tuesday. “This destructive group, over the past three years, has targeted several citizens and members of Kurdistan’s defence forces,” said the KRSC, vowing that the Kalar attack “will not pass unresponded.” “The leadership of the group are responsible for any consequences and responses,” the KRSC statement read.

Akram Salih, the head of the KDP’s 22nd branch in Kalar, said his vehicle was struck by an explosion while parked in front of his house on Monday morning. Salih’s chauffeur and assistant suffered minor injuries in the explosion. In a phone call with the KDP official, fellow party member Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani “condemned the terrorist attack and all political terror attempts, stressing that authorities are investigating the case to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice,” according to a statement from the presidency. Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, who is also a KDP leader, condemned the “terrorist act” against Salih. Authorities in Garmiyan administration have launched an investigation into the incident but have not provided an official statement. The PKK on Wednesday denied it was behind the attack.

Above is the picture of the car of a senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official in Sulaimani province’s town of Kalar was hit by an “explosion” on July15, without causing fatalities.

Economic Dynamics

• While KRG civil servants have received their April salaries, it has been 55 days since KRG Peshmerga and security forces received their March salaries and they have yet to receive their April salaries. According to local sources, the Roj Peshmerga remains one of the key issues, as the Iraqi finance ministry has stated it cannot send their salaries because it directly contradicts the Iraqi constitution, which considers them a foreign group. The KRG PM is currently in Baghdad seeking to resolve the issue of security forces' salaries. There is a possibility that the salaries will be sent by next week, excluding those of the Roj Peshmerga
• On June 8, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) delegation and international oil and gas companies (IOCs) met with Iraqi officials in Baghdad to discuss how to resume Kurdistan’s oil exports. The Iraqi Oil Ministry (IOM), which set up the meeting, had told IOCs to reveal their contracts with Erbil ahead of the meeting. The IOM had initiated cases against the contracts it requested to be disclosed. A source involved in the dialogue told local media that such a request placed the IOCs in “legal jeopardy,” given the court order entered in March that stopped KRG’s oil exports. The June 8 meeting aimed to clear obstacles so the KRG can resume its exports.

Assessment: As of June 9, no particulars of these talks have been revealed, though Iraqi Minister of Oil Hayyan Abdul Ghani said, “there is good progress regarding oil export in the Kurdistan Region. It is getting closer to an agreement on Kurdistan Region oil export-reopen.” Since the pause of Kurdistan’s oil exports, Iraq has lost nearly 15 billion dollars.

• In the months of June-July, As Erbil's water crisis has severely intensified. There is a stark contrast emerges between the city's struggling neighborhoods and opulent developments. While ordinary residents increasingly rely on water tankers, the luxurious Erbil Hills project (pictured), owned by Barzani family members, boasts artificial lakes and golf courses fed by over 100 newly drilled wells per an ex-MP, significantly exacerbating the water shortage.

The severity of the situation is evident in the depths now required for potable water wells, reaching 750 meters. This issue is likely to worsen amid global warming, raising concerns about long-term water security. Opposition politician and ex-MP Ali Hama Saleh claims that the water crisis could be resolved by financing a large-scale water project through the sale of a prime piece of land. This plot, approximately 500,000 square meters in size and located opposite the Rotana Hotel, has instead been allegedly transferred illegally to an investor.

Assessment: This water crisis exemplifies a broader pattern of mismanagement and disregard for local residents as well as a systemic issue of resource allocation and governance. The Erbil Hills project, where houses range from $4 to $10 million, caters to an elite few while tens of thousands of families in poorer neighborhoods struggle. These residents are forced to allocate a disproportionate amount of their income – up to 100,000 dinars monthly – for water alone, in a region where the median income ranges from 300,000 to 400,000 dinars.

• Still in the period of June-July, the payments of the public employee salaries in the KRG-controlled northern Iraq have not been fully resolved. The distribution of public employee salaries in the KRG between military and civilian sectors is as follows: The military sector accounts for 47% of the total salary payments, with over 433,000 personnel and more than 450 billion Iraqi dinars in salary expenditures. Civil servants account for the remaining 53% of the total salary spending.

Analysis: A Brief Look at How the KDP and PUK are Cashing In on the Booming Oil Business

The Kurdistan Region is now experiencing a surge in oil and gas trade through complex means since the official KRG oil export via pipeline to Turkey has been halted since March of last year. The KDP and the PUK have managed to find new ways to produce and sell the oil without returning the proceeds to the KRG treasury. So far, they have also reached an arrangement where the Iraqi government sends salaries to civil servants, although this is becoming increasingly complicated. Iraqi officials are growing increasingly frustrated with the KRG for not providing 400,000 barrels per day as stipulated in the budget agreement and for not sending the non-oil revenues. However, the Iraqi government has recently sent the salaries for April.

According to one of the oil traders directly involved in the business, they “take oil and gas from Lanaz and KAR Group refineries in Erbil to Sulaimani and from there to Iran, and they subsequently end up more than a thousand miles east in Pakistan and Afghanistan." This has also been corroborated by a report on NRT TV. Note, we have reported earlier per Iraqi-KRG joint Financial Oversight Body Report that KRG sell oil to commercial refineries at a mere $7.5 per barrel.

Regarding the arrangement between the KDP and PUK and how much they charge, another oil trader said, "We ship from Erbil to Sulaimani for $25 per ton. The PUK's finance wing (known as General Administration) charges $50 for each tanker for what is known as a 'manifest fee'. On the other hand, each truck entering Erbil from Sulaimani has to pay $350 to KDP-affiliated companies."

Another oil trader added that after the suspension of oil exports to Turkey through the pipeline, the oil market in the Kurdistan Region is thriving. "Oil companies sell all the oil to us because it does not go by pipeline, and we send it to Iran and from there to the UAE, and we sell gas to Pakistan and Afghanistan via Iran."

After the decision of the International Court of Arbitration in Paris and the suspension of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region on March 25, 2023, oil production and sales continue in several oil fields in the Kurdistan Region. According to the investigations of local media currently in some oil fields in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, oil production and sales continue.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is paying $30 to $35 less than the world price of oil to oil refineries in the Kurdistan Region.

Ali Hama Salih, former chairman of the Kurdistan Parliament's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, told local Media that, "Some of the oil from the oil fields that is sold domestically, selling for $250 to $300 a ton (that is $40 a barrel)

Some of it is given to the official refineries (Lanaz and Kar) and some of it is sold to the unofficial refineries. Yadgar Sadiq Galali, the head of Roonbin Organization for Transparency in Oil Processes, explained the sale of oil in the Kurdistan Region in detail to Draw Media, "48 hours after the halt in oil exports, oil field storages were full", Because the oil storage infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region is very weak, only (Sarsang and Taqtaq) fields have very high storage levels.

Taqtaq used to produce 146,000 barrels of oil, but now it produces only 3,610 barrels.

There are (5) refineries in the Kurdistan Region:

• Two refineries in Sulaimani province (Bazian refinery) has a refining capacity of (40) thousand barrels. Dukan refinery has a production capacity of 25,000 barrels.
• There are two refineries in Erbil, Kar refinery has a refining capacity of (170) barrels, Lanaz refinery has a production capacity of (100) thousand barrels of oil.
• There is a refinery in Duhok province belonging to DNO with a production level of 6,000 barrels per day.
• This means that all five refineries in the Kurdistan Region have the capacity to refine 300,000 barrels of oil per day.

Also, a total of 122,000 barrels of oil are sold daily, at a price of about $40 per barrel.

That is, the total monthly revenue of the oil (122,000 * 40 * 30 = 146,400,000 dollars, or (212 billion 280 million) dinars.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has sold some of the oil from the oil fields in the Kurdistan Region for more than 80 days since the March 25, but the revenue has not been declared and paid to the Ministry of Finance. "We load the oil and take it to Sulaimani for $25 a ton at the Tanjaro Square in Sulaimani, where thousands of tankers are sold daily,” a trader who transfer the oil said. Another source estimates 2,000 tankers a day being sold. From there, it is taken to Iran, and the PUK General Administration receives a $50 fee, known as a manifest fee, per ton. The oil is then transported to Iran's Bandar Imam port and from there to the UAE

There are several types of exports:

• Lanaz and Kar gas is exported directly to Iran, and from there to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Crude oil goes to Iran, then to Bandar Imam port, to the UAE, and from there to the global market.

The oil trader said that oil companies are now in fierce competition to buy and ship oil products in the Kurdistan Region because it is lucrative. Currently, a company known as "South Kurdistan" ships about 400 tankers of oil to Iran daily; this company is known for its close ties to the PUK, so they are semi-monopolizing the market as they can pay better prices since they don't pay the so-called manifest fee given their closeness to the PUK.

In addition, the PUK and KDP are now taking money from the checkpoints that separate them, effectively building customs fees between the two zones in the Kurdistan Region. For example, every shipment from Sulaimani to Erbil is charged $350 per truck by a company belonging to the KDP. Therefore, any shipment from Sulaimani to Erbil will have to pay a KDP company, and any shipment from Erbil to Sulaimani will have to pay a fee to a PUK company.

Analysis: The Oil Revenue in the KRG-controlled Northern Iraq

KRG oil revenue over a period of less than seven years amounted to more than $52.552 billion, of which over $5 billion was allocated to transportation costs, per a report by Roonbin Organization for Transparency in Oil Processes. The report covers the period between 2017 and the suspension of Kurdistan oil exports on March 25, 2023, following the decision of the International Court of Arbitration in Paris. Total revenues during this period were more than $52,726,378,000.

Annual Revenue Breakdown:

2017: $7.923 billion

2018: $7.914 billion

2019: $8.438 billion

2020: $4.448 billion

2021: $9.125 billion

2022: $12.422 billion

First quarter of 2023 (until March 25): $2.452 billion.

According to the report, the cost of transporting oil from the Kurdistan Region's fields during this period accounted for 10.53 percent of total revenues.

Oil transportation costs in the Kurdistan Region fall into two main categories: Costs of oil transportation within the Kurdistan Region: Total: $2.644 billion

Breakdown:

Kurdistan Regional Pipeline: $2.564 billion

Pipeline inspection expenses: $29.294 million

Transportation by tanker: $50.958 million

Oil transportation costs within Turkey: Total: $2.907 billion.

Internal Transportation Expenses Roonbin provided more details on transportation costs. The expenditure for the KRG pipeline for oil transportation within Kurdistan was $2.564 billion, broken down by year as follows: 2017-2018: No information available in the reports

2019: $644.372 million

2020: $645.604 million

2021: $870.174 million

2022: $274.818 million

2023 (until export cessation): $129.303 million.

Transportation of Oil from the Border to the Port of Ceyhan The costs of transporting Kurdistan oil from the border to the port of Ceyhan totaled $2.907 billion, broken down as follows:

2017: $480.984 million

2018: $436.249 million

2019: $494.186 million

2020: $304.492 million

2021: $434.412 million

2022: $618.129 million

2023 (until export cessation): $139.397 million.

$50 Million in Field-to-Pipeline Tanker Transportation Costs The report also detailed the costs incurred to transport oil by tanker from the fields to the pipeline. These expenses for the period from 2017 to March 25, 2023, were as follows:

2017: $4.279 million

2018: $9.772 million

2019: $10.45 million

2020: $108,000

2021: $14.978 million

2022: $11.369 million

2023 (until export cessation): Not specified.

TURKEY

Political Dynamics

• On June 3, Turkish government assigns first trustee (state-affiliated administrator) to the Kurdish city of Colemerg (Hakkari) after arresting and removing the elected mayor Mehmet Siddik Akis (from the pro- Kurdish DEM Party) for PKK-linked charges. The Ministry of Interior issued a written statement saying that a government-appointed trustee will replace co-mayor Akış. The ministry also accused Akış of holding a high- level position in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), viewed as a terrorist organization by Ankara. The statement added that there is an ongoing case against Akış on charges of “leading an armed terrorist organization”, “being a member of an armed terrorist organization” and “making propaganda for an armed terrorist organization”. On June 5, in his first trial, the court in Hakkari sentenced Siddik Akis to 19 years and six months imprisonment for “leading an armed terrorist organisation.” The trial was based on a lawsuit against him and several other people who are accused of carrying out violent activities on behalf of the PKK between 2009 and 2013

Following the arrest and the verdict, DEM Party published the following statement on their social media accounts: “Every time the will of the people defeats the government, they resort to the methods they know best: illegal disregard of the popular decision through coup d’état. This morning our Hakkari co-mayor Mehmet Sıddık Akış was detained in Van and the police seized our municipality.

Other opposition parties and organizations also issued statements condemning the arrest and replacement. Main opposition CHP is sending a delegation to Hakkari to protest government decision to remove elected Kurdish mayor from office and appoint state trustee. Özgür Özel, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), has openly condemned the appointment of a trustee to the Hakkari Municipality. He cited the detention of the mayor and the ongoing lawsuit as reasons for his condemnation, raising concerns about governmental interference in local governance and the erosion of democratic principles

The arrest and removal from office of Mehmet Sıddık Akış, the Democratic Party Mayor of Hakkari, and the appointment of Hakkari Governor Ali Çelik as a trustee, has caused unrest in the region. The Ministry of Interior has imposed bans on protests, events, marches, and outdoor meetings in Hakkari, Ağrı, Iğdır, Tunceli, Şırnak, Van, Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Siirt, and Mardin in order to prevent possible protests following the appointment of a trustee. In order to prevent protests against the appointment of a trustee after the detention of Hakkari Mayor Mehmet Sıddık Akış as part of a terrorism investigation, several provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern regions have imposed a ban on such actions. The announcements made by the governorates also warned that those who come to the cities to protest the trustee appointments will not be allowed to enter.

On June 5, in his first speech about the arrest of Hakkari Major, President Erdoğan said, "The law has done what is necessary and will continue to do so from now on."

Why this matters? The appointment of a trustee to Hakkari Municipality and the detention of the mayor have significant implications for democratic governance and the rule of law in Turkey. This move could further erode trust in the government and lead to increased tensions between the state and pro-Kurdish political representatives.

Minister of Internal Affairs Ali Yerlikaya signed the order for Nakit's dismissal. In response, DEM party members gathered at the party's Provincial Organization building to protest the police raid. Şaban Alkan, a DEM Party member, stated, "Elected people and personnel are not allowed into the building. They told us that our co-mayor had been taken into custody. We do not recognize and reject this decision."

The DEM party has condemned the appointment of a trustee, describing it as an attempt by the government to usurp the will of the people. The Labour Party (EMEP) echoed this sentiment, calling the decision "an attack on the will of not only the people of Hakkari but all the people of Turkey."

The Hakkari Governor's Office has banned demonstrations and events following the arrest of Co-Mayor Akış. The Ministry of Interior announced the appointment of the trustee on social media, further fueling the controversy.

The DEM party and the Labour Party (EMEP) have issued statements on their social media accounts condemning the appointment of a trustee. The DEM Party stated, "Once again, the government, defeated by the will of the people, has resorted to the usurpation of will and coup that it knows best... This coup and trustee mentality is a threat not only to Hakkari but to the will of all the people of Turkey."

This incident is part of a broader pattern where Turkish authorities have detained pro-Kurdish mayors, accusing them of ties to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The DEM party, which is the third largest in Turkey's parliament, has consistently denied any association with the PKK.

The situation in Hakkari highlights the ongoing tensions between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish political representatives. As this scenario unfolds, questions about the future of local governance and democratic representation in Turkey remain at the forefront.

Assessment: This move is a clear indication that nobody should hope for a detente (or normalization) in Turkey when it comes to the Kurdish question in Turkey. Once again a trustee, the governor, is replacing the elected mayor in Hakkari. Mayor Sıddık Akış was certificated to run for mayorship in March and now the Interior Ministry lists dozens of allegations about him without waiting for a verdict.

It is likely that President Erdogan is trying to gain time and gloss over the atmosphere created by the 31 March local election defeat by creating the atmosphere that he is trying to get rid of his ultra-nationlaist ally the MHP party. Erdogan’s remarks after the arrest of the Hakkari major prove this assumption. So, in coming months, one should note that Erdogan will neither burn bridges with MHP nor change his attitude towards the Kurdish political movement. It is therefore important for the main opposition CHP party that had the privilege of Turkey’s 1st party in terms of votes received at the local election to take a clear stance against the trustee.

• • In June 2, Ayşegül Doğan, the spokesperson for the pro-Kurdish Dem Party, was prevented from traveling to Europe for a conference despite being taken off the travel ban in 2023 due to her political activism. This government crackdown comes as the country’s inflation recently reached a record high of 75%.
  • On June 13, the co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), Tülay Hatimoğulları, criticized the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, who has repeatedly called on the Turkish government to remove elected Kurdish mayors and officials. Hatimoğulları described Bahçeli as a “little partner” of power who should investigate the death of a leader in his party instead of engaging in anti-Kurdish actions. She also condemned the government’s actions following the removal of the mayor of Hakkari, who was replaced with a trustee after the building was surrounded by dozens of police and military personnel. “It is clear to the Kurdish people that it is not the laws of Turkey that will govern you; [Erdogan] is saying that the laws of our one-man regime, our Palace regime, are valid,” said Hatimoğulları, criticizing President Erdogan’s remarks after the removal of the Kurdish mayor. The DEM Party continues to rally and hold public events in the Kurdish region, raising concerns about the continued removal of elected Kurdish officials by the government.
  • In the second week of June, Turkish police detained dozens of people in the Kurdish region, including in Diyarbakir (Amed), Van, and Dersim. Concurrently, following the removal of the Kurdish mayor in Hakkari, the Turkish government imposed travel bans on several Kurdish mayors, amid concerns over further dismissals of elected Kurdish officials who seek international funding to address debts incurred by government- appointed trustees before the March elections. In another development, the government advanced to the second phase of the “Kobani Case” hearing, where five politicians, including several Kurds and former Armenian lawmaker Garo Paylan, face lengthy prison sentences. In late May, an Ankara court sentenced several politicians to a total of 407 years in prison. Members of the Dem Party protested outside the court, with Tülay Hatimoğulları, the party’s co-chair, stating, “This [court] decision is a pro-ISIS decision. We never accept these decisions.” The “Kobani Case’‘ stems from protests by Kurds in Turkey against Da’esh terrorists in 2014, who attacked the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani.

• • On July 19, a Turkish court on Friday gave imprisoned Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas an additional two years and six months in jail for allegedly insulting Turkish institutions, courts, and security forces and inciting violence.

Demirtas, who has been jailed since 2016 on terror-related charges, attended the trial in a court in Mersin through video conference from Edirne prison. The case related to speeches he made in 2015 and 2016 in which he was accused of “publicly insulting the government of the Republic of Turkey, judicial organs, the military and the security forces,” reported Bianet. The Kurdish politician denied charges against him and labeled the trial “politically motivated.”

"If I were an ultra-nationalist politician who orchestrated killings in the heart of Ankara and threatened people, no case would be filed against me. Instead, you would protect me. If I were a fascist politician, the judiciary would protect me. But because I am a Kurdish politician exercising my right to criticize, I am prosecuted," Bianet quoted Demirtas as saying in his defense.

Demirtas is currently serving a 42-year sentence he was given in a separate trial in May. He was one of several Kurdish politicians convicted over 2014 protests related to the defense of Kobane city against the Islamic State (ISIS) in northeast Syria. Demirtas was the co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) when the nationwide demonstrations took place.

Demirtas and a large number of his colleagues from the HDP, which has now been rebranded as the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) due to the party’s legal issues, have been jailed over alleged ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). DEM Party condemned the latest ruling, labeling it "null and void in the eyes of us and the people."

SYRIA

Political Dynamics

• A local election in northeast Syria scheduled for the second week of June is raising mounting concerns inside and outside the war-torn country.

The voting, planned for June 11, was to be held in parts of Syria that are controlled by U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF. The de facto autonomous region is governed by the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. But Turkey, a NATO ally, considers the SDF and its political entities to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group labeled as terrorist by Ankara and Washington Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is threatening military action if Kurdish groups in Syria go ahead with the elections.

"We are closely following the terrorist organization's aggressive actions against the territorial integrity of our country and Syria under the pretext of an election,” Erdogan said during a public ceremony last week. “Turkey will never allow a separatist organization to establish a terrorist entity in northern Syria and Iraq. … We have done what needs to be done before in the face of fait accompli, and we will not hesitate to take action if we encounter the same situation,” the Turkish leader said, referring to Turkish military offensives against Kurdish fighters in Iraq and Syria. Turkey's defense minister says plans by U.S.-backed Kurdish groups to hold local elections in northern Syria are “unacceptable" and a threat to Turkey's national security.

The United States has also said the time is not right for holding any elections in Syria. "Any elections that occur in Syria should be free, fair, transparent and inclusive, as called for in UNSCR 2254, and we don’t think that the conditions for such elections are in place in northeast Syria in present time,” State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said in a statement posted May 31 by the U.S. Embassy in Syria on social media platform X. our Kurdish parties in Syria filed a request on Tuesday asking the local election commission to delay the vote. They had previously announced their intention to participate in the election. Turkey-backed Syrian opposition groups have also opposed the vote, calling for protests against it in areas controlled by the Turkish military and its Syrian allies in northern Syria. The government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has not publicly commented on the matter.

On June6, The High Election Commission in NE Syria postponed the municipal elections until August, at the request of some political parties. The statement pointed out the reason for the postponement was due to the tight schedule allocated for campaigning and to have enough time to communicate with international organizations to monitor the electoral process.

• On June 23, Turkish-backed Syrian factions arrested several civilians in occupied Afrin. Also in Afrin, the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH)approved the construction of a new settlement on Kurdish lands. Local Kurds recently accused the Qatar Red Crescent and several Kuwaiti organizations of building settlements for non-Kurds to engineer demographic change. Turkish-backed groups previously demolished a Yazidi shrine in Afrin on June 13.
• On July 12, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on July 12 that he has instructed Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to meet Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to start to restore relations with Syria.

“I have already called on Mr. Assad for a visit to Turkey or a meeting in a third country and I have instructed my foreign minister on this matter,” Erdoğan said at a news conference at the NATO summit. “We want to start a new process by overcoming this resentment,” the Turkish president noted. Erdoğan has recently strengthened his normalization rhetoric with Syria after years of nearly no diplomatic relationship and attacking personally Assad. Erdoğan's linguistic shift to call Assad "Mr." also attracted attention, as in the past he often addressed him using derogatory terms, including "murderer."

Syria’s foreign ministry said on July 13 a normalization of ties with neighboring Turkiye depended on Ankara withdrawing troops from its territory. The statement came days after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he might invite Syrian counterpart Bashar Assad to Turkiye to try and reconcile ties between the two countries that went sour after war broke out in Syria in 2011.

And earlier on Saturday Erdogan went further when he announced the imminent end to the Turkish forces’ operation against Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq and Syria.Turkiye has launched successive offensives across the border in Syria to expel Kurdish forces from border areas in northern Syria, with pro-Turkish forces controlling two vast border areas of northern Syria.

Erdogan supported early rebel efforts to topple Assad at the start of the war in 2011, but reversed course in recent years, with top officials from both countries meeting in Russian-mediated talks.

Earlier this month Erdogan pointed to a possible meeting with Assad in Turkiye “at any moment.”

“Now we have come to such a point that as soon as Bashar Assad takes a step toward improving relations with Turkiye, we will show him the same approach,” Erdogan said Sunday.

Meanwhile, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had responded to President Erdogan the day before. Esad, who stated that the talks could begin, listed his conditions. In his statement to journalists in his country, Esad stated that the content of the meeting with Erdogan depends on the situation. Esad said that he would meet with Erdogan if the issue of the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Syrian territory is brought up.

The foreign ministry in Damascus, in its statement on July 14, said that any bid to restore ties between Syria and Turkiye “must be built on clear foundations that ensure the desired results... foremost of which is the withdrawal of illegally present forces from the Syrian territory, and the fight against terrorist groups that threaten not only Syria’s security, but also the security of Turkiye.”

Assessment: Russia, which is one of the strongest backers of Assad's government but also has close ties with Turkey, has long been pushing for a return to diplomatic relations. It is likely that the reason behind Erdogan’s call for normalization is Russian effort for this objective. In December 2022, the Turkish, Syrian and Russian defense ministers held talks in Moscow, the first ministerial level meeting between rivals Turkey and Syria since 2011. Russia also brokered meetings between Syrian and Turkish officials last year.

However, the talks fizzled, and Syrian officials publicly continued to blast Turkey's presence in northwest Syria. Assad said in an interview with Sky News Arabia last August that the objective of Erdogan's overtures was "to legitimize the Turkish occupation in Syria." Russia appears to once again be promoting the talks, but this time around, Iraq — which shares a border with both Turkey and Syria — has also offered to mediate, as it previously did between regional arch-rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. One should note that Iraq may have taken the initiative as a way to deflect pressure from Turkey to crack down on the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, a Kurdish separatist group that has waged an insurgency against Turkey since the 1980s and has bases in northern Iraq.

The geopolitical situation in the region has also changed with the war in Gaza and fears of a wider regional conflict. One should see that both countries may be feeling insecure and seeking new alliances in the face of the war's potential regional ripple effects.

From Erdogan's side, the attempt to engage is likely driven in part by the increasing anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey. Erdogan is likely hoping for a deal that could pave the way for the return of many of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in his country. From the Syrian side, a return to relations with Turkey would be another step toward ending Assad's political isolation in the region after more than a decade as a pariah due to his government's brutal crackdown on protesters in 2011 and alleged war crimes afterward.

And despite their differences over Turkey's presence in northwest Syria, Damascus and Ankara both have an interest in curtailing the autonomy of Kurdish groups in northeast Syria. Turkey may be concerned that the security situation in northeast Syria could deteriorate in the event that the U.S. withdraws troops it currently has stationed there as part of a coalition against the Islamic State militant group, Unluhisarcikli said. That could require Turkey to cooperate or at least coordinate with Syria, to manage the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal.

One should also see that two governments likely hope for modest "economic gains" in a rapprochement. While trade never completely stopped, it currently goes through intermediaries, he said, while restoring diplomatic relations would allow official commerce to resume and make trade more fluid.

Overall, one should note that the talks are unlikely to bring about the full Turkish withdrawal from northwest Syria that Damascus has called for or any other major shift in conditions on the ground in the near term. Although the two countries' interests "actually overlap to a large degree. there are also major disagreements and a lot of bad blood and bitterness that could impede even lower-level deal-making. Both Erdogan and Assad may also want to wait for the outcome of U.S. elections, which could determine the future American footprint in the region, before making a major deal. In the long run, however, the logic of the situation dictates Turkish-Syrian collaboration in some form They're neighbors. They're stuck with each other and the current stalemate does them no good.

In Turkey and in government-controlled Syria, many view the prospects of a rapprochement positively. In northwest Syria, on the other hand, protests have broken out against the prospect of a normalization of relations between Ankara — which had previously positioned itself as a protector of the Syrian opposition — and Damascus. Kurds in Syria have also viewed the potential rapprochement with apprehension. The Kurdish-led authority in northeast Syria said in a statement that the prospective reconciliation would be a "conspiracy against the Syrian people" and a "clear legitimization of the Turkish occupation" of previously Kurdish-majority areas that were seized by Turkish-backed forces.

Conflict Dynamics

• In June, Turkish drones have launched multiple airstrikes, targeting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, at least six SDF members were killed, and twelve civilians were wounded near Qamishliand Hasakah. One of the airstrikes targeted an ambulance transporting the injured to a hospital. This recent Turkish aggression comes after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened a new military invasion if the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration for North and East of Syria (AANES) proceeds with the planned local election on June 11. The US also opposes the elections in the region, citing a lack of compliance with ‘UN Security Council Resolution 2254’. The AANES condemned the Turkish attacks and stated, “The Turkish occupation aims to destroy the democratic project and thwart the holding of municipal elections,” urging the international community to “fulfill its responsibilities to stop theTurkish aggression.” Amid ongoing pressure, four Kurdish parties have requested a delay in the elections, according to officials in the electoral commission.
• For several weeks, terrorist attacks by ISIS (Da’esh) have intensified across the Syrian desert (Badia), including Deir Ez Zor. At least sixteen Syrian soldiers have been killed by a Da’esh minefield in Badia, an area known as the death triangle, lying between Raqqa, Homs, and Deir Ez Zor. Russia has launched several airstrikes, but this has not stopped Da’esh attacks on Syrian regime soldiers. In Deir Ez Zor’s Hajin subdistrict, Da’esh terrorists killed two members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on Thursday. This comes as the SDF released a confession video of two terrorists responsible for attacks. Moreover, at least four Da’esh terrorists were arrested by the SDF in Shaheel and Tel Hamis districts. In the US, an American terrorist named Abdelhamid Al-Madioum was sentenced to ten years in prison for fighting alongside the terrorist group in Syria and providing “material support.” According to the Justice Department, the terrorist joined Da’esh after flying from the US to Morocco and Syria.
• On July 17, The Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria (Rojava) on Wednesday decreed a general amnesty for those prisoners “whose hands are not stained with blood,” including those jailed on terror charges. The Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (DAANES) declared a general amnesty for people not involved in bloody activities. The amnesty is granted to people charged with terrorism crimes committed before Wednesday, and crimes committed against the security of the DAANES, the Kurdish administration said in a ruling. The sentence of people temporarily held in prisons will be halved, life sentences will be reduced to 15 years in jail, and people with chronic diseases or aged over 75 will be released. “Leaders, emirs and trainers of terrorist organizations” and “members of terrorist organizations participating in hostile activities against the Syrian Democratic Forces” are excluded from the amnesty. People involved in explosions and crimes that led to the death of civilians also cannot benefit from the amnesty.

Criminals at-large cannot benefit from the amnesty unless they surrender within 60 days. The Rojava administration said in a separate statement that the amnesty was a response to requests from tribal leaders during a forum held in May, adding that it does not include people "whose hands are not stained with blood." The statement said that the Kurdish administration will further facilitate the exit of Islamic State-linked families from the notorious al-Hol camp in Hasaka.

Assessment:

Iraqis and Syrians make up the majority of the 40,000 ISIS-linked people who have been held at al-Hol camp since the military defeat of ISIS in 2019. The camp has been branded as a humanitarian disaster and a breeding ground for terrorism by security experts.

Kurdish authorities in Rojava repeatedly have called on the international community to repatriate their nationals from the camps, but their calls have largely gone unanswered as most countries are unwilling to bring back their citizens due to security concerns.

• Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, renewed threats of invasion if the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration for North and East of Syria (AANES) pursues the local elections on August 10. The AANES has postponed the elections that were set for June 11 after immense pressure from the region and international powers, including disapproval from the US. Erdogan said his chief of spies, Hakan Fidan, held talks with his Russian counterpart and President Putin about the elections.

Assessment: The AANES released a statement against Qatar’s Red Crescent and Kuwaiti institutions for their role in the “demographic changes” in the Turkish-occupied Afrin region. Several settlements have been built on Kurdish lands and properties by Qatari and Kuwaiti organizations for displaced Arabs since 2018, when Turkey and radical Sunni groups occupied Afrin. The AANES emphasized that they will work on all levels in an “international investigation and hold accountable those involved in such unethical policies.” Separately, Turkish-backed factions continued infighting in Afrin, resulting in more casualties, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).

IRAN

Political Dynamics

• In early June, the Iranian regime arrested a number of Kurdish activists last week, including Zara Nabizadeh in Mehabad, Hataw Akrami and Afsaneh Shahii in Bokan, Hamidreza Arovaneh in Dehloran, Sajjad Moradivandan in Abdanan, Osman Galawezhi in Piranshahr, Massud Dalawand inKhurmawa, Adel Khalani in Sardasht, Matin Mehdizadeh in Shinno, Seyad Amhedian in Takab, and Houshmand Moradi in Tehran. Many of the detainees are charged with mocking the death of former Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi. The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights said the Iranian regime detained 141 people in May, 80 of whom were Kurds. Meanwhile, Iranian border guards killed a 19-year-old Kurdish border porter (kolbar) near Baneh and wounded two others near Marivanand Shinno. Another kolbar died after falling into a river while trying to evade Iranian authorities in Sardasht.

Conflict Dynamics

• On June 13, Iran's acting foreign minister was in Erbil after visiting Baghdad and set to visit Sulaimani shortly as well. A key topic that was discussed is the activation of the security agreement (Tehran-Baghdad- Erbil) reached last year with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, which targets Iranian Kurdish groups operating within the Kurdistan Region. Although Iran has exhibited a more flexible approach with the mediation of the UN and the exploration of new methods for dealing with these forces.

Assessment: Iraq is the third foreign country that Iran's acting foreign minister is visiting after Syria and Lebanon, following the death of Iran's president and foreign minister in a helicopter crash.

Key issues Worth Monitoring in Coming Two Months

• Whether or not Ankara will be appointing the state trustees to those Kurdish municipalities governed by the elected Kurdish DEM party majors in the Kurdish-majority Southeast
• Whether or not the Kurdish SDF will be able to hold local elections in northeast of Syria despite Ankara, Tehran and Damascus’s criticisms. The postponed local elections in the SDF-controlled northeast of Syria. Ankara sees this election organized by the US-backed SDF in the northeast of Syria as an PKK-organized political activity so as to strengthen de-facto political autonomy of the Kurdish ruling in Syria. Both Tehran and Esad regime have also been very critical on this election because this election my not only further degrade the political authority&influence of Damascus in Syria but also make things more cimplicated for the new Syrian constitution.
• Ankara recently seems to be very eager to re-start dialogue with the Esad regime in Syria. Despite Damascus’s incessant calls for unconditional withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Syria as the first condition for the re-engagement, Ankara seems not willing to withdraw its soldiers yet. If starts, the scale, scope and timing of engagement process between Ankara and Damascus will be very critical for the Kurdish quest in Syria because the US-backed Kurdish SDF’s attempts for political&economic autonomy have been raising eyebrows both in Ankara and Damascus, Thus, whether or not there will be concrete steps for the re-start of engagement between Ankara and the Esad regime in coming months is worth watching as these efforts will have direct impact on the Kurdish quest in Syria.
• Whether or not Turkey will further intensify its military operations on northern Iraq and attempt to establish permanent military outposts inside Gara mountain, critical region app. 200 km. away from the Turkey- Iraq border and known as the hotbed for the PKK’s military bases connection Qandil region to northeast of Syria.
• Whether the new leadership of the Turkey’s main opposition party CHP will automatically support AKP- MHP coalition’s hawkish political stance when it comes to Kurdish politics in Turkey or the CHP’s new leadership will have more critical and pro-Kurdish stance in the Turkish politics.